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I Introduction
Picture the following scenario: Professor X informs her public university
administrator of her decision to disseminate research results on the controver-
sial subject of socialized medicine. The university administrator subsequently
blocks Professor X's publicationbased on the administrator's beliefthat (1) Pro-
fessor X's position is politically unpalatable and (2) the publication of such
research results would adversely affect the university's interests. Most would
agree that the administrator's action is impermissible because it violates the
First Amendment academic freedom2 rights of the state university professor
1. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court determined that the First
Amendment also limits the powers of the states in Gilow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,666 (1925).
2. Federal courts often use, but do not explain, the term "academic freedom." See W.
Stuart Stuller, High SchoolAcademic Freedom: The Evolution of a Fish Out of Water, 77 NEB.
L. REV. 301, 302 (1998) ("[Clourts are remarkably consistent in their unwillingness to give
analytical shape to the rhetoric of academic freedom."); see also J. Peter Byrne, Academic
Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendmenl" 99 YALE L.J. 251, 253 (1989)
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Now imagine that another member of a state university faculty, Professor
Y, wishes to access sexually explicit materials on a state-owned computer to
research sexual themes in various topics such as art, literature, history, and
law. Furthermore, suppose that a state statute requires Professor Y to receive
prior written approval from his university administrator to access this sexually
explicit material. The administrator refuses to allow Professor Y to research
sexually explicit material on the Intemet because of the administrator's belief
that (1) the position held by Professor Y is politically unpalatable and (2) the
publication of such research results would adversely affect the interests of the
university. Like the example of Professor X, one would assume that the
statutory permission requirement inherently violates Professor Y's First
("Lacking in definition or guiding principle, the doctrine [of academic freedom] floats in the
law, picking up decisions as a hull does barnacles.").
However, there has been much scholarly literature discussing and defining academic
freedom. Professor Rabban has stated that Professor Lovejoy wrote "what is probably the most
influential short definition of academic freedom":
Academic freedom is the freedom of the teacher or research worker in higher
institutions of learning to investigate and discuss the problems of his science and
to express his conclusions, whether through publication or in the instruction of
students, without interference from political or ecclesiastical authority, or from the
administrative officials in the insitution in which he is employed, unless his
methods are found by qualified bodies of his own profession to be clearly incompe-
tent or contrary to professional ethics.
David Rabban,DoesAcademic Freedom LimitFacultyAutonomy?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1405,1408
n.1 1 (1988) (quoting Lovejoy, Academic Freedom, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL Sci-
ENcEs, 384, 384 (1930)). For other useful short definitions of academic freedom, see Fritz
Machlup, On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic Freedom, reprinted in ACADEMIc
FREEDOM AND TENURE 177,178 (L. Joughin ed., Univ. of Tex. Press 1967) (defining academic
freedom); William Van Aistyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General
Issue of Civil Liberty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDoM, 59, 71 (E. Pincoffs ed., 1972)
(same). This Note will discuss both the professional and constitutional definitions of academic
freedom. See infra Parts Hl-1l.
3. This Note focuses on academic freedom in public colleges and universities. However,
if a court were to find a sufficient level of governmental support to constitute "state action," the
First Amendment could apply in a private institutional setting. See Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1961) (holding that privately owned restaurant located
within public parking garage was involved sufficiently with state authority to bring its racially
discriminatory actions within proscription of Fourteenth Amendment). To date, courts have not
found that governmental support of private colleges or universities constitutes state action. See
Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in
America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1291-92 n.72 (1988) (noting that "[a]s far as academic freedom
is concerned; a private university will be bound by whatever its own rules, contractual agree-
ments, and good sense may dictate, but not by what the Constitution decrees"); see also Richard
H. oiers, Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: 0 Say, Does That Star-
Spangled Banner Yet Wave?, 40 WAYNE L. REV, 1, 2 n.2 (1993) (stating that courts have not
found that governmental support of private colleges or universities constitutes state action).
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Amendment rights of academic freedom; it impermissibly restricts Y's free-
dom of research and inquiry." According to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit, however, that assumption is wrong.5
In Urofsky v. Gilmore," the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit recently upheld a 1996 Virginia statute that prohibits any state em-
ployee from using Virginia-owned computer equipment to access or store
sexually explicit content unless the employee first obtains written permission
from a supervisor to access the prohibited material.7 Six professors at Vir-
ginia public institutions challenged the constitutionality of the statute alleging
that it interfered with their academic freedom to conduct research and to
teach.8 The professors, who teach on subjects such as AIDS, human sexuality,
4. See Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 71 (defining academic freedom). Professor Van
Alstyne defined academic freedom as follows:
"[A]cademic freedom" is characterized by a personal liberty to pursue the investigation,
research, teaching, and publication of any subject as a matter of professional interest
without vocational jeopardy or threat of other sanction, save only upon adequate
demonstration of an inexcusable breach of professional ethics in the exercise of that
freedom. Specifically, that which sets academic freedom apart as a distinct freedom is
its vocational claim of special and limited accountability in respect to all academically
related pursuits of the teacher-scholar: An accountability not to any institutional or
societal standard of economic benefit, acceptable interest, right thinking, or socially
constructive theory, but solely upon a fiduciary standard of professional integrity. To
condition the employment or personal freedom of the teacher-scholar upon the institu-
tional or societal approval of his academic investigations or utterances, or to qualify
either even by the immediate impact of his professional endeavors upon the economic
well-being or good will of the very institution that employs him, is to abridge his
academic freedom.
Id.; see also infra Part VI.B.2 (explaining that statutory permission requirement at issue in
Urofsky v. Gilmore violated academic freedom by imposing impermissible prior restraint on
scholarly research, writing, and dissemination on Internet).
5. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,416 (4th Cir. 2000) (en bane), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1070 (2001) (upholding Virginia statute that censors freedom of inquiry and research
of state-employed university professors on Internet); see also infra Part VIA (asserting that
Virginia statute violated academic freedom of university professors by censoring academic
research, writing, and communications).
6. 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1070(2001).
7. See Urofskyv. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,415-16(4th. Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1070 (2001) (upholding Virginia statute restricting state employees from accessing
sexually explicit material on computers owned or leased by state). The court concluded that the
challenged statute did not infringe upon First Amendment rights of state employees in general
and that the statute did not infringe on the academic freedom rights of university faculty. Id.
at 416; see also infra notes 215-307 and accompanying text (discussing Urofsky in depth).
8. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 405-06. The plaintiffs named in Urofsky v. Gilmore now must
choose between seeking university permission to conduct on-line research or self-censoring
their Net surfing activity. See Courtney Macavinta, Virginia Cracks Down on Sexual Conduct,
at http'/www.CNET.com:News/Entertainment&Media/Story (Feb. 11, 1999) (discussing
Urofsky case). For example, plaintiff Terry Meyers feared he could get in trouble for his study
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popular culture, and poetry, also claimed that the prior permission requirement
restricted their academic freedom because it imposed an impermissible prior
restraint.9 They argued that the Virginia Act permitted the state to restrict the
inquiry and knowledge of Virginia state university professors and reduced the
independence of those professors by placing a substantial veto power in the
hands of university administrators.10
Generally, courts have been willing to offer significant free speech pro-
tection to professors under the theory of academic freedom." Academic free-
of a nineteenth century poet named Algernon Charles Swinbume. Id. Meyers, professor and
chair of the English Department at the College of William and Mary, said Swinbume's work
was too provocative to slip by the Virginia law. Id. Meyers stated, "It's a very scary decision,
and it strikes at the heart of First Amendment rights on the Net and academic freedom .... I
now have to ask permission from my dean to read online poems that I specialize in." Id.
A supervisor told Paul Smith, a professor of English and cultural studies at George Mason
University, to remove five nude pictures from a Web Site that accompanies his course. Id.
Ironically, the photos were part of an assignment on censorship for his popular culture course
examining the media's descriptions of gender and sexuality. Id. They fell under the state's
definition of "sexually explicit" Id.
Melvin L. Urofsky, the lead plaintiff in the district court, alleged that he had declined to
assign an online research project on indecency law because he feared he would be unable to
verify his students' work without violating the Act. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 409 n.9. Plaintiffs
Dana Heller, Bernard H. Levin, and Bryan J. Delaney maintained that they were hesitant to
continue their Internet research on various aspects of human sexuality. Id.
9. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Association of University Professors and the
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression at 16-19, Urofsky v. Gilmore,
69 U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2001) (No. 00-466) [hereinafter AAUP Urofsky Amicus Brief]
(arguing that Virginia law discriminates based on sexually explicit content and imposes
impermissible prior restraint); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21-25, Urofsky v. Gilmore, 69
U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2001) (No. 00-466) [hereinafter Urofsky Brief for Petitioner]
(asserting that both prior restraint licensing requirement and public disclosure provision chill
academic discourse and other bona fide research about sexuality).
10. Professor Rabban summarizes the traditional conception of academic freedom as
follows:
Classic discussions of academic freedom stress the freedom of the professor to investi-
gate, teach, and publish, subject only to scholarly standards and professional ethics.
Other restrictions on the choice of research or on the expression of scholarly views,
whatever their source, violate academic freedom. The social functions performed by
professors justify this broad freedom. Critical inquiry and dissemination of research
by university professors is essential to the advancement of knowledge. Professors
cannot perform these vital roles if others intimidate or punish them for expressing their
scholarly judgments, which may often challenge or enrage those who hold prevailing
conventional views. The roles of professors are also undermined by suspicions that
nonprofessional considerations have influenced their judgments.
Rabban, supra note 2, at 1408-09 (1988) (citations omitted).
11. See generally William W. Van Alstyne,Academic Freedom and the FirstAmendment
in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, reprinted in
FREEDOM AND TENURE IN THE ACADEMY 79, 79-154 (William W. Van Alstyne ed., 1993)
(tracing usage of term "academic freedom" in Supreme Court).
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dorn includes the freedom of individual professors to teach, research, and
publish opinions on issues of public concern.' However, the Fourth Circuit
spurned any individual claim of academic freedom in Urofsky." Judge
Wilkins, writing for the majority, claimed that "[tjhe Supreme Court, to the
extent it has constitutionalized a right to academic freedom at all, appears to
have recognized only an institutional right of self-governance in academic
affairs.""4 In a concurring opinion, Judge Luttig emphatically stated that
"there is no constitutional right of free inquiry unique to professors or to any
other public employee . . . the First Amendment protects the rights of all
public employees equally."15  Finally, while Judge Wilkinson extolled the
virtues of academic inquiry and curiosity, he also concurred in the judgment
because '"he limited restrictions in th[e] Act are administered within the
traditional structure of university governance."
16
Thus, instead of deciding the case by focusing on the individual profes-
sor's academic freedom to research and to disseminate ideas, the Urofsky
court analyzed the professor's speech as a mere subset of speech by "public
employees."' 7 The Fourth Circuit applied the public employee analysis that
the Supreme Court developed in Pickering v. Board of Education,' Connick
v. Myers, 9 Waters v. Churchill," and United States v. National Treasury
Employees Union.2 That analysis requires a court to balance the free speech
rights of public employees against the government's interest as employer to
prevent disruption in the efficient delivery of public services.' The majority
12. See Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure, reprinted in FREEDOM AND TENURE iN THE AcADEMY, supra note 11, at 8 (dividing
academic freedom into the following three parts: freedom to investigate, freedom to teach, and
freedom to publish, subject only to scholarly standards and professional ethics).
13. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,412(4th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert denied, 531
U.S. 1070 (2001) (rejecting "individual" academic freedom).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 425 (Luttig, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 434 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 428 (Wilkinson, C.J., concur-
ring) (stating that "[a]cademic inquiry is necessary to informed political debate" and that
"[a]cademic curiosity is critical to useful social discoveries"). Chief Judge Wilkinson also noted
that "[b]y restricting Internet access, a state thus restricts academic inquiry at what may become
its single and most fruitful source." Id.
17. Id. at 415 (concluding that "because the Act does not infringe the constitutional rights
of public employees in general, it also does not violate the rights of professors").
18. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
19. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
20. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
21. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
22. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (modify-
ing Pickering-Connick balancing test); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (plurality
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concluded that because the Act did not infringe the constitutional rights of
public employees in general, it also did not violate the academic freedom of
professors. 23
This Note argues that the majority and concurring opinions of Urofisky
erred by applying the Pickering-Connick balancing test to the speech of public
university professors .2  The Pickering-Connick balancing test pertains to the
speech of public employees that has the potential to disrupt the efficient
administration of government. 2 In contrast, academic freedom is a concept
relevant to an entirely different species or subset of speech: research, inquiry,
and expression of thought that contributes to the realm of human knowledge
and insight.26 This Note argues that the First Amendment protects the type of
academic speech involved in Urofsky under the rubric of academic freedom."
To engage in critical inquiry, professors need some degree of independence
from their university employers, and universities need some degree of inde-
pendence from the state.' As noted by one commentator, "the search for truth
requires that scholars receive the protection of academic freedom in posing
opinion) (adding new procedural requirement to Pickering-Connick balancing test); Connick
v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (refining Pickering balancing test); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968) (establishing balancing test for public employee's speech); see also
Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,406 (4th Cir. 2000) (en bane), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1070
(2001) (quoting Connick). Urofsky construes the Pickering-Connick balancing test as follows:
A determination of whether a restriction imposed on public employee's speech
violates the First Amendment requires 'a balance between the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees'.
Id.
23. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 415.
24. See infra Part VI (demonstrating flaws in Fourth Circuit's analysis in Urofsky). There
is no issue in Urofisky of academic freedom rights at the elementary or secondary school level,
at which teachers generally do not engage in independent research and writing. Urofsky, 216
F.3d at 409 n.8. Nor is there any issue regarding professors' control over curriculum content.
Id.
25. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing Pickering line of cases as
applied to public employee speech); see also infra Part IV (analyzing Supreme Court public
employee free speech cases in detail).
26. See infra Parts U-ill (describing development of professional and constitutional
definitions of "academic freedom").
27. See infira Part VI.B (arguing that scholarly research, writing, publication, and speech
on any matter of professional concern deserves pure First Amendment protection rather than
consideration as factor in Pickering balancing test).
28. See generally David M. Rabban, A FunctionalAnasis of "Individual" and "Institu-
tional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendmen4 reprinted in Freedom and Tenure in
the Academy, supra note 11, at 229-301 (discussing "tension" between individual and institu-
tional academic freedom).
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new, controversial, or unpopular ideas in their teaching and research." '29 Thus,
this Note asserts that the Fourth Circuit's approval of a licensing scheme that
singles out and chills research and writing on "sexually explicit" subjects
violates academic freedom by discriminating based on content and by consti-
tuting an impermissible prior restraint.30
Part II of this Note chronicles the historical background of the academic
freedom concept.3 1 Part II.A briefly describes how the German university
system provided the basis for the American conceptualization of academic
freedom.32 Part II.B discusses the professional definition of academic free-
dom.33 Part III examines the constitutional definition of academic freedom. 34
Part IV tracks the evolution of the Supreme Court's analysis of the relation-
ship between the First Amendment and public employee speech in the work-
place. 5  Part V fully develops the facts of the Urofsky case. 6  Part VI.A
emphasizes that constitutional academic freedom protects the freedom of
research, writing, inquiry, and publication of individual professors.3 ' Part
VLB critiques the Fourth Circuit's misguided reliance on the Pickering-
29. Michael A. Olivas, Reflections on ProfessorialAcademic Freedom: Second Thoughts
on the Third "Essential Freedom," 45 STAN. L. REv. 1835, 1836 (1993). Professor Olivas
emphasized that traditional academic freedom has been incorporated into constitutional
interpretations of First Amendment penumbral rights as "protecting the freedoms of inquiry,
thought, and choice of what to teach." Id. In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas inter-
preted the First Amendment penumbral rights as following:
The association of the people is not mentioned in the Constitution nor in the Bill
of Rights. The right to educate a child in a school of the parents' choice - whether
public or private or parochial - is also not mentioned. Nor is the right to study any
particular subject or any foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has been
construed to include certain of those rights .... [T]he State may not, consistently
with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowl-
edge. The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter
or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and
freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach - indeed the freedom
of the entire university community. Without those peripheral rights the specific
rights would be less secure.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (citations omitted).
30. See infra Part VI.B (arguing that Virginia Act is unconstitutional as content-based
discrimina tion and prior restraint).
31. See infra Part II (discussing historical and professional development of academic
freedom).
32. See infra Part ilA (describing historical background of academic freedom).
33. See infra Part 1l.B (explaining professional definition of academic freedom).
34. See infra Part I (discussing constitutional definitions of academic freedom).
35. See in'fra Part IV (examining public employee speech cases and their application to
academic setting).
36. See infra Part V (setting forth facts of Urofsky v. Gilmore).
37. See infra Part VI.A (emphasizing constitutional recognition of academic freedom).
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Connick balancing test and demonstrates why scholarly speech deserves full
First Amendment protection under the doctrine of academic freedom.s Part
VI.C illustrates how the Fourth Circuit's approval of the Virginia statute's
licensing scheme contravenes the Supreme Court's First Amendment rulings
as an impermissible content-based discrimination and as an impermissable
prior restraint. 9 Part VII discusses the impact ofthe Fourth Circuit's decision
in Urofsky on the free inquiry and dissemination rights of public university
professors and concludes that the value of free and independent academic
speech to both teachers and society merits its full protection under the First
Amendment.4°
II. The History ofAcademic Freedom
Commentators have noted that "[a]cadenic freedom, a concept often
used to defend a variety of speech and conduct that occurs on our nation's
campuses, is poorly understood and ill-defined."41 Thus, a brief overview of
the history of the concept of academic freedom in the United States is a
necessary preface for this Note's analysis. Academic freedom encompasses
a professor's freedom to teach, freedom to research, and freedom to publish
opinions on issues of public concern. 42 Academic freedom is rooted in Eur-
38. See infra Part VIB (finding that Fourth Circuit misapplied Pickering-Connick
balancing test to academic speech and concluding that restrictions on academic speech should
be subject to strict scrutiny).
39. See infra Part VI.C (analyzing Fourth Circuit's holding as content-based restriction
and impermissible prior restraint).
40. See infra Part VII (summarizing issues and recommendations and providing conclu-
sion).
41. Olivas, supra note 29, at 1835; see Byrne, supra note 2, at 253 (noting reluctance of
courts to define academic freedom); Stuller, supra note 2, at 302 (commenting on unwillingness
of courts to give "analytical shape to the rhetoric of academic freedom"). In contrast, Professor
Metzger stated that although "[a] sizeable literature of legal commentary asserts that the Su-
preme Court constitutionalized academic freedom without adequately defining it," he believes:
[Ilt can be shown that the Supreme Court Justices knew what they meant by aca-
demic freedom when they introduced it, and that [the] inaugural definition- though
imperfectly communicated to the lower courts and subsequently overlaid with a
different definition by the Court itself- was never disavowed, but continued to influ-
ence Court opinions until a decade ago as a subsurface guide, and since then more
overtly.
Me zger, supra note 3, at 1290-91.
42. See Metzger, supra note 12, at 8-9 (dividing academic freedom into three-part defini-
tion). However, Professor Metzger recognized that some scholars divide academic freedom into
the following two parts: freedom to teach and freedom to perform research. Id. at 9 n.8 (citing
Stephen R. Goldstein, Academic Freedom: Its Meaning and Underling Premises in the
American Experience, 11 IsRAML . REV. 52 (1976); Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 71). Thus,
Professor Metzger stated:
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 299 (2002)
opean traditions and in our society's recognition that "institutions of higher
education are conducted for the common good ... which depends upon the
free search for truth and its free exposition."43
A. The German View ofAcademic Freedom
Prior to the late nineteenth century, Americans did not consider institu-
tions of higher education as centers of research and scholarship. 44 Rather, the
role of these institutions of higher education was to pass received wisdom on
to the next generation.45 In the late nineteenth century, the German notion of
academic freedom consisted generally of the following three concepts:
Lehrfreiheit, Lemfreiheit, and Freiheit der Wissenschaft." Lehrfreiheit, or
freedom to teach, embodied the notion that professors should be free to
conduct research and to publish findings without fear or reproof from the
church or state.47 Lehrfreiheit also included the authority of the individual
professor to determine the content of courses and lectures. 4  Lernfreiheit
And though most... divide academic freedom... into three main parts, some insist
that good logic would divide it into only two (freedom to teach and freedom to do
research, arguably the only professionally relevant freedoms, with citizen or extramural
freedom ceded to the large neighboring country of ordinary civil liberties), and a few
would divide it into four (the three that go with the faculty's roles plus one attached to
the students' status) or even five (all of the four individual academic freedoms, along
with institutional academic freedom, also known as institutional autonomy).
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Harry F. Tepker, Jr. & Joseph Harroz, Jr., On BalancingScale,
Kaleidoscopes, and the BlurredLimits ofAcademic Freedom, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 1,2 n.4 (1997)
(discussing division of academic freedom into parts).
43. AM. ASS'N. OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIS ON ACADMIC
FREEDOM AND TENURE, reprinted in FREEDOM AND TENURE IN THE ACADEMY, supra note 11,
at 407-09 app. B [hereinafter 1940 STATEMENT]; see infra Part HA (discussing how German
principles of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit influenced more formal academic freedom principles
and jurisprudence in United States); see also Metzger, supra note 3, at 1267-85 (discussing
influence of German academic system on "generically American, profession-centered, multifac-
eted definition of academic freedom"); Metzger, supra note 12, at 14-15 (describing European
roots of American definition of academic freedom); Rabban, supra note 28, at 232-35 (analyz-
ing theory of academic freedom in American Association of University Professors' 1915
Declaration of Principles).
44. See Byrne, supra note 2, at 267-69 (noting that prior to Civil War, goal of higher
education was to train young men in religious piety and mental discipline as preparation for
clergy and other gentlemanly professions, such as law and medicine).
45. See id. (noting that America developed "unique" sense of academic freedom because
its colleges began with corporate structure governed by outside boards of non-academics).
46. See Metzger, supra note 3, at 1267-85 (analyzing American adaptation of German
concept of academic freedom).
47. See id. at 1269-75 (discussing German principle of"Lehrfreiheit").
48. See id. at 1269 (noting that Lehrfreiheit allowed professors to "decide on the content
of their lectures and to publish the findings of their research without seeking prior ministerial
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encompassed the right of students to determine the course of their studies for
themselves."" Finally, Freiheit der Wissenschaft conceptualized the notion of
academic self-government - the university's right, under the direction of its
senior professors organized into separate faculties and a common senate, to
control its internal affairs.'
The American tradition of academic freedom evolved from this German
theory." Between 1870 and 1900, many American college graduates migrated
to German universities for advanced instruction and returned persuaded that
the Germans' concept of academic freedom should be mirrored in the United
States. 2 However, the American definition of academic freedom was more
focused than its German precursor in that the American theory centered
almost exclusively on the freedom of the individual teacher and researcher."
or ecclesiastical approval or fearing state or church reproof; it protected the restiveness of
academic intellect from the obedience norms of hierarchy").
49. See id. at 1270 (stating that Lernfreiheit "amounted to a disclaimer by the university
of any control over the students' course of study... [and] also absolved the university of any
responsibility for students' private conduct, provided they kept the peace and paid their bills").
50. See id. (classifying Freiheit der Wissenschaft as "the university's right, under the
direction of its senior professors organized into separate faculties and a common senate, to
control its internal affairs" or as "[alcademic self-government").
51. See id. at 1271 (recognizing that "[a]bout half the members of the [AAUP] committee
were alumni of German universities, and those who had gone elsewhere did not have to be
reminded of where the concept of academic freedom, in its most imposing form, had origi-
nated"). Professor Metzger then stated the following:
No member of this scholarly generation could write about academic freedom and ignore
[the] memorable gift from Deutschtum. Certainly the members of the [AAUP] commit-
tee did not. To forge a serviceable tool for a profession caught up in a clash between its
own heightened self-esteem and resilient social disrespect, they would brandish the
venerable heirloom where they could and alter it only where they felt they must.
Id.
52. See Metzger, supra note 3, at 1269 (stating that many American college graduates
returned from Germany "convinced that the Germans' concept of academic freedom held the
key to their cynosure achievements and should be transplanted onto American soil").
53. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in
Sponsored Research, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1364 n.6 (1988) (discussing traditional American
conception of academic freedom); Matthew W. Finkin, On "Institutional"Academic Freedom,
61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 821 (1983) (arguing that academic freedom supports claims to autonomy
by academic institutions only when institutional autonomy furthers individual freedom of
teaching and inquiry within institution); Walter P. Metzger, Academic Freedom and Scientific
Freedom, DAEDALUS, Spring 1978, at 93, 94-95 (discussing American admiration of academic
freedom in nineteenth-century German universities); Mark Yudof, Three Faces of Academic
Freedom, 32 LoY. L. REV. 831, 834, 848, 851 (1987) (identifying the following three distinct
faces of academic freedom: Personal autonomy of individual scholars, limits on government
restrictions on expression within schools, and autonomy of academic institutions).
Significantly, the American definition of academic freedom does not encompass the
principle of Lernfreiheit (student freedom). See Metzger, supra note 3, at 1273 (stating that
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B. The AA UP's Professional Definition of Academic Freedom
The American Association of University Professors' (AAUP) 1915
Declaration of Principles (1915 Declaration) set forth the classic statement of
the American conception of academic freedom. 4 This statement limited the
concept of academic freedom to the academic freedom of the individual
professor, thereby adapting the German concept of academic freedom to the
American context.5 s The 1915 Declaration defined academic freedom as
comprising the following three elements: "freedom of inquiry and research;
freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extra-
mural utterance and action." 6 It recognized the social benefits of academic
freedom in universities by stressing that a true university is an "intellectual
experiment station, where new ideas may germinate and where their fruit,
though still distasteful to the community as a whole, may be allowed to ripen
until finally, perchance, it may become a part of the accepted intellectual food
of the nation or of the world."5"
The 1915 Declaration identified the greatest threat to academic freedom
as being oppression of individual professors by internal university administra-
tors and governing boards. 8 The 1915 Declaration stressed that society
organized profession "would always assume that academic freedom meant freedom for the
academic, never permissibly less and seldom deservedly more").
54. AM. Ass'N. OF UNIV. PROFEssORs, GENERAL REPORT ON THE COMMrrTEE ONACA-
DEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE (1915), reprinted in FREEDOM AND TENURE IN THE
ACADEMY, supra note 11, at 393-06 app. A [hereinafter 1915 DECLARATION]. The AAUP
issued the 1915 Declaration in response to the widespread dismissal of faculty members by
administrators and trustees who disagreed with the expression of professors, including profes-
sors teaching Darwinism and speaking out for free silver. See WALTER P. METZGER, ACADEMIC
FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF TIm UNIVERSITY 145-47 (1955) (commenting on violations of
academic freedom in 1890s).
55. See 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 54, at 393 (stating that "the freedom which is the
subject of this report is that of the teacher"); see also Walter P. Metzger, The German Contribu-
tion to the American Theory ofAcademic Freedom, in THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM 23-24 (Walter P. Metzger ed., 1977) (finding that American theorists focused almost
exclusively on freedom of individual teacher and researchers); Rabban, supra note 28, at 232
(recognizing that 1915 Declaration "limited itself to the academic freedom of the professor,
while recognizing that student academic freedom had been a major component of the German
tradition").
56. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 54, at 393. Significantly, the 1915 Declaration
emphasized that academic freedom of inquiry and research "is almost everywhere so safe-
guarded that the dangers of its infringement are slight." Id. Ironically, in Urofsky v. Gilmore,
the freedom of inquiry and research is the aspect of academic freedom that the Fourth Circuit
suppressed. See in'fra notes 308-22 and accompanying text (analyzing Urofsky).
57. See 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 54, at 397-99.
58. Id. at 394-95; see also Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 1364-71 (discussing traditional
American concept of academic freedom); Metzger, supra note 3, at 1266 (defining two types
of academic freedom: professional academic freedom and constitutional academic freedom).
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should regard professors as appointees rather than as employees because
professors, like judges, must remain independent of their nominal employers
to perform their professional functions.' The responsibility of the university
professor is primarily to the public; thus, the proper fulfillment of the work of
the professorate required freedom from institutional imprimaturs. ° Accord-
ingly, under a newly created "professional-centered" definition of academic
freedom, the AAUP protected the individual professor rather than the univer-
sity in its institutional capacity.6
Although the 1915 Declaration focused primarily on the threat that
university trustees posed to academic freedom, it also recognized that legisla-
tures could endanger academic freedom.62 The 1915 Declaration noted that
legislators might attempt to control the academic inquiry of professors by
conditioning the receipt of funds upon political considerations.' Thus, the
1915 Declaration reemphasized that the university should be an "inviolable
refuge from... tyranny."6
The AAUP, together with the Association of American Colleges and
Universities, also authored the joint 1940 Statement of Principles on Aca-
demic Freedom and Tenure (1940 Statement), which codified the academic
freedom of research and teaching by faculty.6' The 1940 Statement declared:
59. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 54, at 397; see also Rabban, supra note 28, at 233
(commenting that both professors and judges must remain independent of their nominal em-
ployers to perform their professional functions).
60. See 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 54, at 397 (recognizing professors' obligation
to public). Specifically, the 1915 Declaration stated the following:
The responsibility of the university teacher is primarily to the public itself, and to the
judgment of his own profession; and while, with respect to certain external conditions
of his own vocation, he accepts a responsibility to the authorities of the institution in
which he serves, in the essentials of his professional activity his duty is to the wider
public to which the institution itself is morally amenable.
Id.
61. See Rabban, supra note 28, at 232 (stating that 1915 Declaration "limited itself to the
academic freedom of the professor, while recognizing that student academic freedom had been
a major component of the German tradition").
62. See id. at 233 (noting that 1915 Declaration "focused primarily on boards of trustees,
the acknowledged source of power in universities"). Professor Metzger makes clear that the
drafters of the 1915 Declaration decided not to challenge lay control of universities. Metzger,
supra note 3, at 1276-78. The drafters accepted that "'outside' was ensconsed within." Id. at
1277.
63. 1915 DECLARATION, supra note 54, at 400.
64. Id.
65. 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 43, at 407-09. The AAUP defined academic freedom
as encompassing three primary facets:
(a) The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results,
subject to the adequate performance of... other academic duties; but research for pecun-
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"freedom in research is fundamental to the advancement of truth."" Accord-
ingly, the 1940 Statement treated academic freedom as the individual freedom
of university professors.'7 One hundred and seventy-two professional organi-
zations and learned societies have endorsed the 1940 Statement, and hundreds
of universities have incorporated it into their college bylaws, faculty contracts,
faculty handbooks, and collective bargaining agreements. 68
The 1915 Declaration and the 1940 Statement endure as hallmarks of
academic freedom and the norm of academic practice in the United States.69
However, the AAUP's professional definition of academic freedom is an
example of what Professor William J. Van Alstyne calls "soft law. 70 It is the
AAUP that polices the 1940 Statement rather than the courts.71 The universi-
iary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the institution.
(b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he
should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no
relation to his subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other
aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment
(c) The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned profession, and
an officer of an educational institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he
should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in the
community imposes special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational
officer, he should remember that the public may judge his profession and his institution
by his utterances. Hence he should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate
restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort
to indicate that he is not an institutional spokesman.
Id. at 407-08.
66. Id. at 407.
67. Id. at 405 (noting that academic freedom applies to both teaching and research of
individual professors).
68. See Amy H. Candido,A Right to TalkDiry?: Academic Freedom Values and Sexual
Harassment in the University Clasroom, 4 U. Cm. L. Sc-L RouTABLE 85, 86-87 (1997)
(stating that 1940 Statement is observed widely through its adoption into bylaws, faculty con-
tracts, and collective bargaining agreements).
69. See Metzger, supra note 12, at 77 (stating that if it does endure, 1940 Statement will
do so "because it serves the enduring interests of the academic profession and the academic
enterprise"); see also Rabban, supra note 28, at 232 (recognizing that "[t]he AAUP's 1915
Declaration of Principles, the first comprehensive analysis of academic freedom in the United
States, remains the foundation for the nonlegal understanding of academic freedom within the
academic world").
70. See Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 80 (noting that "[i]n comparison with the soft law
of the 1940 Statement, the first amendment is hard law indeed"). Professor Van Alstyne
classifies the 1940 Statement as an example of"very soft law," while the First Amendment, with
its general protection of free speech, is a "fixed constitutional provision, even if limited to acts
of government ... [which] is at the opposite end of the legal order from the precatory law of
the AAUP." Id. at 79-80.
71. See id. at 79 (commenting that 1940 Statement is "soft law" because it is "policed
principally by Committee A of the AAUP and by publication of AAUP's ad hoc committee
investigation case reports in the AAUP's professional journal").
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ties must incorporate the 1940 Statement in their official policies for the 1940
Statement to have legal effect. 72 Therefore, the theory of academic freedom
needed a basis in "hard law," such as the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution."3
II Academic Freedom in the United States Supreme Court
The term "academic freedom" did not achieve widespread judicial usage
until the 1950s and 1960s.," The courts first paid attention to the concept of
academic freedom as a response to government investigations of alleged com-
munist conspiracies." In the so-called "glory years"76 of academic freedom
during the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court identified academic freedom
as "a special concern of the First Amendment."7  Yet, somewhat problenati-
cally, the Court has never seized the opportunity to explain systematically the
theory behind its incorporation of academic freedom into the First Amend-
ment.78 Consequently, appellate courts have found it difficult to resolve "the
tension between the individual and institutional components of academic
freedom."79
72. See id. at 80 (stating that "[the] 1940 Statement generally requires affirmative institu-
tional action of some sort to cany its provision into legal effect," as when university adopts it
and makes it part of faculty's contractual guarantee). Examples of affirmative institutional
action are "incorporation by reference into college or university bylaws, into letters of faculty
appointment, or collective bargaining agreements." Id.
73. See id. (affirming that Bill of Rights, including First Amendment, is "part of our
fundamental law" and that "its protections are enforceable in every court in United States").
74. See Metzger, supra note 3, at 1285 (noting "curious exception" of Kay v. Board of
Higher Education, 18 N.Y.S.2d 821,829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940), which recognized constitution-
ally protected academic freedom by stating that academic freedom was "the freedom to do good
and not to teach evil").
75. See Rabban, supra note 28, at 235, 237 (noting that "term 'academic freedom' first
attracted constitutional attention during the 1950s, in connection with the more general response
by Supreme Court to goverment investigations of alleged communist conspiracies").
76. See Hiers, supra note 3, at 6-12 (discussing "glory years" of academic freedom).
77. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). For a full discussion of
Keyishiansee infra notes 109-15 and accompanying text.
78. See Rabban, supra note 28, at 230 (commenting that although Supreme Court has
glorified academic freedom in "hyperbolic rhetoric," it has produced "only scant, and often
ambiguous, analytic content"). Professor Byrne presents the fullest discussion of the relation-
ship between the AAUP definition and the constitutional definition of academic freedom.
Byrne, supra note 2, at 251. Professor Metzger provides a comprehensive taxonomy of these
two definitions while explaining how they differ rather than how they relate. Metzger, supra
note 3, at 1265.
79. Rabban, supra note 28, at 230. "Some commentators, [such as Professor Byrne and
Professor Metzger,] have maintained that the courts . . . seem to be defining constitutional
academic freedom exclusively in institutional terms." See id. (refuting analysis of both Profes-
sors Byrne and Metzger). Professor Rabban convincingly states that while "courts may have
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court consistently has recognized that the
First Amendment protects the academic freedom of individual professors."0
Additionally, the Court has extended the First Amendment right of academic
freedom to institutions 8' Recognition of institutional academic freedom,
however, does not support the additional conclusion that the Court has re-
jected a constitutional right of individual professors to academic freedom. 2
Thus, this Part chronicles the Supreme Court's approval of academic freedom
as a "special concern of the First Amendment." 3
A. The Beginning of Judicial Recognition of Constitutional
Academic Freedom
The term "academic freedom" first appeared in a dissent by Justice
Douglas, a former academician, in a 1952 case, Adler v. Board ofEducation.S4
been presented with more institutional claims than individual claims of academic freedom...
they have also recognized that the first amendment protects individual academic freedom." Id.
80. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,250(1957) (plurality opinion) (stating
that "[t]o impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities
would imperil the future of our Nation"); infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text (discussing
Sweezy); see also Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (noting that "academic freedom. . . is of transcen-
dent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned"); inf'a notes 109-19 and
accompanying text (discussing Keyishan).
81. See Regents Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985) (recognizing institu-
tional academic freedom); infra text accompanying notes 123- 29 (analyzing Ewing).
82. Rabban, supra note 28, at 230. Assertions of academic freedom under the First
Amendment tend to arise in one of the following three ways: "claims of professors against
faculty colleagues, administrators, or trustees; claims of professors against the state; and claims
of universities against the state." Id. at 231. Occasionally, these claims may conflict. Id. As
William A. Kaplin and Barbara A. Lee explain:
Constitutional principles of academic freedom have developed in two stages, each
occupying a distinct time period and including distinct types of cases. The earlier
cases of the 1950s and 1960s focused on faculty and institutional freedom from
external (political) intrusion. These cases pitted the faculty and the institution against
the state. Since the early 1970s, however, academic freedom cases have focused
primarily on faculty freedom from institutional intrusion. In these later cases, faculty
academic freedom has collided with the institutional academic freedom.
W!LWAm A. KAPuN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 301 (1995)..
83. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see infra Part M (discussing
evolution of "academic freedom" in Supreme Court).
84. See Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 509 (1952) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (using
term "academic freedom"). In Adler, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
New York Feinberg Law, a statute that provided for the disqualification and removal from civil
service and public employment of any person advocating, advising, or teaching governmental
overthrow by force, violence, or unlawful means. Id. at 486-91. A group of public schoolteach-
ers claimed that the Feinberg Law constituted an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and
assembly of persons employed or seeking employment in the New York public schools. Id. at
491-92. The Adler Court sustained the statute from facial attack by relying on the right-
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In Adler, a group of NewYork public schoolteachers claimed that the Feinberg
Law violated their First Amendment rights.85 The state statute provided for the
disqualification and removal from public employment of any "subversive
persons" who had made treasonable or seditious statements.' 6 The Adler
majority used the now discredited right-privilege distinction to sustain the
statute from facial attack: "If [teachers] do not choose to work on such terms
[as those in New York limiting First Amendment rights], they are at liberty to
retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere. Has the State thus
deprived them of any right to free speech or assembly? We think not."'"
Although the Adler majority concluded that the statute did not violate the
First Amendment rights of the teachers, Justice Douglas, in his dissenting
opinion, conceptualized a theory of academic freedom that a majority of the
Court later accepted.8' Douglas found fault with the Feinberg Law because
the statute intimidated teachers.' 9 He declared that "[tihere can be no real
privilege distinction. Id. at 491-95. The Court did not consider government employment to be
a constitutional "right" because state employees remained at liberty to retain their beliefs and
associations and go elsewhere. Id. at 492.
85. Id. at 491-92.
86. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3022 (McKinney 1981).
87. Id. at 492 (citations omitted). Fifteen years later, the right-privilege distinction no
longer held weight with the Court, and Adler substantially was overruled by Keyihian, 385
U.S. at 605-06 ("[C]onstitutional doctrine which has. emerged since [Adler] has rejected its
major premise. That premise was that public employment, including academic employment,
may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by
direct governmental action .... [TIhat theory was expressly rejected in a series of decisions
following Adler.") (citations omitted); see infra discussion at notes 109-19 and accompanying
text (discussing Keyzshian).
The Supreme Court only repudiated the right-privilege distinction after decades of
confusing discussion. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439,1462-64(1968). In a 1926 economic
due process case, the Court held that states may not take away constitutional rights "under the
guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens
otherwise to withhold." See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94
(1926) (striking down state law requiring transportation company to perform as common
carrier). In other cases, the Court has struck down governmental policies requiring waiver or
surrender of rights as a precondition to governmental benefits. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) ('IT~he Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden
distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of
procedural due process rights."); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254,262 (1970) (stating that "the
constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are
a 'privilege' and a 'right'").
88. Adler, 342 U.S. at 508.11 (Douglas, J., dissnfing); see Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 609-10
(holding Feinberg Law unconstitutional); infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text (discussing
Keyishian). In Keyishian, Justice Brennan, speaking for a bare majority, found that the
Feinberg Law imperiled academic freedom. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
89. Adler, 342 U.S. at 510 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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academic freedom in [an] environment" of exclusion and teacher fear.9 Sig-
nificantly, Justice Douglas's dissent identified academic freedom as a subset
of the First Amendment freedom.9 Justice Douglas stated that 'he Consti-
tution guarantees freedom of thought and expression to everyone in our
society .... [N]one needs it more than the teacher."' 2
In the same term as Adler, Justice Felix Frankfurter, another former
academician, provided a concurring opinion that identified academic freedom,
although not by name, as a subset of the First Amendment.s In Wieman v.
Updegraff,94 the Court held unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute requiring
public employees to take a loyalty oath stating that they had not associated
with specific organizations.9" In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter
emphasized that although the Fourteenth Amendment' protects all persons,
no matter what their calling, "in view of the nature of the teacher's relation
to the effective exercise of the rights which are safeguarded by the Bill of
Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibition of freedom of thought,
and of action upon thought, in the case of teachers brings the safeguards of
90. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas also argued that the "system of spying
and surveillane ... cannot go hand in hand with academic freedom." Id. at 510-11 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
91. See Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 107 (noting importance of Justice Douglas's use
of academic freedom as distinct, identified subset of constitutional First Amendment concern).
92. Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
93. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(recognizing concept of academic freedom as subset of First Amendment); jee aLso Van Alstyne,
supra note 11, at 107-09 (providing in-depth analysis of Wieman).
94. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
95. See Wieman, 344 U.S. at 191 (distinguishing Adler by claiming that, unlike Feinberg
Law, statute in question excluded persons from state employment based solely on membership
in organization, regardless of any knowledge of organization's purpose). The Wieman Court
reviewed a state statute requiring compliance with a broad disclaimer oath as a condition of
public employment. Id. at 184-91. The statute permitted the elimination from public employ-
ment any person affiliated with any listed subversive organization, whether or not the disquali-
fied person was aware of whatever it was that made the organization subversive when he or she
joined. Id. at 186-87. The Weman Court concluded that the "indiscriminate classification of
innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power." Id. at 191. Thus,
the Wieman Court held the statute unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment Id. at 190-91.
96. Standing alone, the First Amendment is not addressed to the states. However, in
1931, the Supreme Court incorporated the full Free Speech and Free Press Clause into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to hold invalid a state law. See Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931) (incorporating provisions of First Amendment into Four-
teenth Amendment); see also DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (same). Since
193 1, the Supreme Court has treated the Fourteenth and First Amendments as "framing parallel,
binding restrictions on the national and state governments, although neither by itself applies to
private entities not operating as agencies of the state." Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 80 n.3.
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those amendments vividly in operation."" Thus, the concept of academic
freedom, although not the actual term, initially emerged into Supreme Court
jurisprudence through dissenting and concurring opinions." It is clear,
however, that the conceptualization of academic freedom as a subset of the
First Amendment began primarily with an emphasis on the rights of individual
teachers.
B. Majority Approval ofAcademic Freedom
A majority of the Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amend-
ment protects the academic freedom of state-employed professors. 99 Further-
more, the Court extended these holdings to institutions as a complimentary
layer ofprotection for academic speech."00 Therefore, the academic research,
writing, and publication of individual professors merits full First Amendment
protection under the doctrine of academic freedom.101
1. The Bedrock Cases
A majority of the Court finally recognized academic freedom as a consti-
tutional matter in 1957, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire. " The Supreme Court
97. Wieman, 344 U.S. at 195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter also stated
that teachers "must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into the
meaning of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history of social and economic
dogma." Id. at 196 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
98. See supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text (tracing usage of academic freedom
doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
99. See nfra Part IILB.1 (discussing Supreme Court's recognition of "individual"
academic freedom).
100. See infra Part 1.B.2 (analyzing Supreme Court's more cent protection of "institu-
tonal" academic freedom).
101. See infra Part VIA-B (concluding that academic research, writing, and publication
on Internet deserves full First Amendment protection under strict scrutiny standard rather than
under lowered scrutiny under Supreme Court's public employee free speech analysis).
102. 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality opinion). Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan,
concurred with the plurality's holding. Id. at 255-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice
Frankfurter did not refer explicitly to "academic freedom," but he did at several points agree
with the plurality's position. Id. (Frankfurter, I., concurring). For example, Justice Frankfurter
stated the following:
The problems that are the respective preoccupations of anthropology, economics,
law, psychology, sociology and related areas of scholarship are merely departmental-
ized [ways of] dealing... with interpenetrating aspects of holistic perplexities. For
society's good - if understanding be an essential need of society - inquires into these
problems, speculations about them, stimulation in others of reflection upon them,
must be left as unfettered as possible. Political power must abstained from intrusion
into this activity of freedom, in the interest of wise government and the people's well-
being, except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling.
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reversed the conviction of Paul Sweezy, a member of the University of New
Hampshire faculty, for refusing to answer the Attorney General's questions
about his associations with the Progressive Party and about the content of a
lecture he had given at the university. 03 The Court held that "there unques-
tionably was an invasion of petitioner's liberties in the areas of academic free-
dom and political expression - areas in which government should be ex-
tremely reticent to tread."]
4
Chief Justice Warren's plurality opinion in Sweezy contains the Court's
fullest discussion of academic freedom:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a de-
mocracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose
any straitjacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universi-
ties would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so
thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be
made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any,
principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an
Id. at 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter emphasized "the dependence of
free society on free universities," adding, "[tihis means the exclusion of governmental interven-
tion in the intellectual life of a university." Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He then
stated that "[i]t matters little whether such intervention occurs avowedly or through action that
inevitably tends to check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars, qualities at once so fragile and
so indispensable for fruitful academic labor." Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Thus, although
Justice Frankfurter did not explicitly use the term "academic freedom," a majority of the Court
clearly shared the opinion that academic freedom was essential to American society. See
Richard H. Hiers, New Resbictions on Academic Free Speech: Jeffries v. Harleston 11, 22 J.C.
& U.L. 217, 222-23 (1995) (stating that "even though a majority of the Sweezy Court could not
agree on common language, a majority shared the belief that academic freedom was essential
for the proper functioning and future of American society").
103. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,240-44,248-49 (1957) (plurality opinion).
In Sweey, the Supreme Court considered whether political investigation by the New Hampshire
legislature deprived the defendant, Paul Sweezy, of due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment Id. at 235. Sweezy arose from an investigation of "subversive activities" by the
New Hampshire Attorney General. Id. at 238. Sweezy, the target of the investigation, refused
to answer certain questions regarding a guest lecture he had given at the University of New
Hampshire. Id. His refusal to answer these and other questions ultimately resulted in his inear-
ceration for contempt. Id. at 244-45. On certiorari review of the decision of the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court affirming the decision, a plurality of four justices indicated that the action
of the state unquestionably infringed on Sweezy's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and
political expression. Id. at 250. However, the plurality opinion moved away from the discus-
sion of First Amendment concerns of free speech and academic freedom to hold that there was
insufficient evidence in the record to sustain the claim that the legislature directed the use of its
legislative power in the appointment of the Attorney General to act as a committee for the
legislature. Id. at 251-54. Consequently, the plurality concluded that because the Attorney
General lacked the authority to investigate Sweezy, the conviction violated the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment Id. at 254-55.
104. Id. at250.
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atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die. "
The passionate language in this paragraph extols the virtues of academic
freedom by recognizing the importance to society of individual scholarship." °
The plurality condemned the New Hampshire Supreme Court for finding that
the governmental interest in self-preservation outweighed the deprivation of
constitutional rights of the individual."° Chief Justice Warren declared that
there is no circumstance in which the state interest could justify infringement
of individual rights in the field of academic freedom."°
Ten years after Sweezy, the Court declared in Keyishian v. Board of
Regents!' that academic freedom is a "special concern of the First Amend-
ment."" ° The Keyishian Court struck down the New York Feinberg Law,
previously upheld in Adler, as constitutionally infirm." 1 The Court found that
the statute had a "stifling effect on the academic mind [by] curtailing freedom
of association" in violation of the First Amendment." 2 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Brennan described academic freedom as "a transcendent value to
all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned" and characterized the
classroom as a marketplace of ideas." 3 He observed that the future of the
105. Id.
106. See Rabban, supra note 28, at 239 (recognizing Court's identification of two distinct
social benefits of academic freedom). Professor Rabban noted that Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence in Sweezy recognized that "[c]ritical inquiry within universities is essential to the
preservation of a democratic society and, as a somewhat independent matter, promotes discover-
ies and understanding necessary for civilization." Id.
107. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 251.
108. Id. at 253-55.
109. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
110. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). In Keyishian, the Supreme
Court reconsidered the constitutionality of the Feinberg Law, which Adler had upheld fifteen
years earlier. Id. at 593-95. Noting the pertinent constitutional doctrines that had arisen in the
interim, and the absence of any claim of vagueness in Adler, the Keyishian Court decided that
Adler was no longer controlling. Id. at 595. The Keyishian Court ruled that the complex law
was unconstitutionally vague and struck down the Feinberg Law on its face on substantive First
Amendment grounds. Id. at 600-04.
111. See id. at 609-10 (holding law invalid as applied to those in public education). The
Feinberg Law is the same package of laws that the Court upheld against a challenge by school-
teachers in Adler. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text (discussing Adler).
112. Keyshian, 385 U.S. at 607. According to Professor Van Alstyne, Justice Brennan
"placed the protection of academic freedom within the core of First Amendment concerns and
not at its margins." Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 114.
113. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. Justice Brennan stated the following:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
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country "depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."" 4 Furthermore,
Justice Brennan emphasized that the government may regulate the area of
First Amendment freedoms only with narrow specificity.' Thus, the Su-
preme Court clearly linked the concept of academic freedom to the First
Amendment.
These early cases recognized that the protection of individual academic
inquiry and scholarship is at the core of academic freedom.116 The Keyishian
Court connected the concept of academic freedom to the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment and to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 7 Furthermore, the Court's opinions extolled academic freedom
as an "essentiality" or "transcendent value" to society as a whole, whether
threatened from outside political interference or from inside oppression on the
part of administrators or faculty colleagues. 8 Thus, the Supreme Court
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. The vigilant protec-
tion of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools. The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The
Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than
through any kind of authoritative selection.
Id. at 603 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)) (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. See id. at 604 (noting that "[blecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space
to survive, government may only regulate in the area with narrow specificity").
116. See id. at 603 (indicating focus is individual interest in academic freedom). In hold-
ing that government inquiry into the contents of a university lecture "unquestionably was an
invasion of (the lecturer's] liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression,"
the Court in Sweezy recognized both academic freedom and political expression as individual
First Amendment rights. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality
opinion); see supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text (discussing Sweezy). In emphasizing
the impact of the mandatory state law on teachers in Keyishian, the Court indicated its focus on
individual interests in academic freedom. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967); see supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text (discussing Keyishian).
117. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (recognizing academic freedom as special concern of
First Amendment); see also Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 112 (stating that "distinct principles
of academic freedom were linked directly to the protections of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments").
118. See supra notes 101, 106, 113 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
recognition of academic freedom as valuable societal interest); see also Hiers, supra note 102,
at 225-26 (noting that Supreme Court's major academic freedom cases implicitly recognized
value of academic freedom, "whether threatened from outside political interference, or from
inside arbitrary or intentional retaliation on the part of administrators or faculty colleagues").
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emphasized the social importance of independent and critical inquiry in the
search for truth at universities."1 9
The Supreme Court has treated academic freedom as an institutional right
of universities, as well as an individual right ofprofessors"2 In the last decade,
the Supreme Court's decisions concerning academic freedom have protected
the university itself from government interference in the performance of
fundamental educational functions.' Because universities function through
the ideas and scholarship of faculty members, individual and institutional
independence often are intertwined and political intrusion may threaten both." 2
2. Interplay Between Individual and Institutional Academic Freedom
The Court first explicitly acknowledged the existence of institutional
academic freedom in Regents of University ofMichigan v. Ewing. " At issue
was a former student's due process challenge to his expulsion from a special
medical degree program." In Ewing, the Court observed that "[alcademic
119. See Rabban, supra note 2, at 1405 (stating that "[tiraditional conceptions of academic
freedom emphasize that faculty autonomy in research, teaching, and publication is essential to
the search for knowledge"); see also Rabban, supra note 28, at 240 (maintaining that Supreme
Court realized "that the search for truth, in universities as well as in society generally, is never
complete and requires free debate about competing ideas that precludes any imposition of
ideological orthodoxy").
120. See Rabban, supra note 28, at 229 (stating that "constitutional definition [of academic
freedom) emphasized the protection of the "entire university community against state interven-
tion"); see also infra Part MI.B.2 (discussing institutional academic freedom). This First
Amendment right inures in the university's "corporate capacity." See Byme, supra note 2, at
311-39 (analyzing constitutional academic freedom and protection of institutional autonomy).
"Significantly, the AAUP's first Supreme Court brief on the subject of academic freedom
stressed that university autonomy from the state is a necessary condition for the academic
freedom of professors." Rabban, supra note 28, at 229 (citing AAUP's Brief as Amicus Curiae,
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959)).
121. See Byrne, supra note 2, at 311 (defining "institutional" academic freedom).
122. Id. at312.
123. 474 U.S. 214 (1985). With respect to substantive academic judgments within uni-
versities, the Court declared the following:
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic
decision . . .they may not override it unless it is a substantial departure from
accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsi-
ble did not actually exercise professional judgment .... Added to our concern for
lack of standards is a reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of state and local
educational institutions and our responsibility to safeguard their academic free-
dom, "a special concern of the FirstAmendment"
Id. at 225-26 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
124. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1985) (considering
dismissal of student from medical degree program). In Ewing, the Supreme Court considered
the decision of medical school faculty and administrators to dismiss a student from a combined
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freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of
ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on
autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself."1 25  On behalf of this
proposition, the majority opinion cited Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke.'26 In Bakke, Justice Powell quoted Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion in Sweezy that referred to "the four essential freedoms" of a univer-
sity.' " These four freedoms were the freedom of the university "to determine
undergraduate degree and medical degree program. Id. at 215-28. The student's dismissal
occurred after he failed a required standardized examination with the lowest score ever re-
corded. Id. at 215-16. The Ewing Court determined that judges should not review the decisions
of academic authorities regarding academic dismissals other than to insure that appropriate
officials exercised professional judgment regarding the dismissal. Id. at 226. Thus, the Ewing
Court held that the University did not violate the student's substantive due process rights. Id.
at 227-28. For an in-depth analysis of Ewing, see Steven D. Milam & Rebecca D. Marshall,
Impact of Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing on Academic Dismissal from
Graduate and Professional Schools, 13 J.C. & U.L. 335 (1987).
125. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (commenting on
interplay of individual and institutional academic freedom); see also Piarowski v. I1. Cmty.
Coll., 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th. Cir. 1985) (stating that academic freedom denotes both "freedom
of the academy to pursue its ends without interference from the government ... and the freedom
of the individual teacher ... to pursue his ends without interference from the academy, and
these two freedoms are in conflict, as in this case").
126. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (holding
University of California Medical School's admissions plan unconstitutional). In Bakke, the
Supreme Court considered the validity of a medical school's admission program that set aside
sixteen of one hundred available spots in the school's incoming class specifically for minority
students. Id. at 269-77. The Bakke court invalidated the school's special admissions program
but allowed the university to take race into account as a factor in its future admissions decisions.
Id. at 319-20.
Justice Powell, who announced the opinion of the Court, emphasized our "national com-
mitment" to safeguarding freedoms within university communities, and restated the following
crucial language from Keyishian:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment .... The Nation's
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange
of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through
any kind of authoritative selection."
Id. at 312 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967)) (internal quotations
omitted). Significantly, Justice Powell did not "choose between the institutional definition of
[academic freedom] he put forward and the individual definition he continued to accept."
Metzger, supra note 3, at 1310-11 (analyzing Bakke). Professor Metzger noted, "Arguing that
a university permitted to select a diverse student body would be advancing the Constitution's
delight in the 'robust exchange of ideas,' Powell implied that the two definitions of academic
freedom were inherently in accord, or at least easily reconcilable." Id. at 1311 (quoting Bakke,
438 U.S. at 312-13).
127. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,263
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC., 493 U.S. 182, 197-202 (1990)
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for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.'2
Thus, in Ewing, the Supreme Court recognized that academic freedom
encompasses the right of universities to act free from judicial interference
with academic decisions. 29 Since then, some scholars, as well as the Fourth
Circuit, have opined that constitutional academic freedom extends only to
institutions as an institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs. 3°
However, the Court's recent focus on institutional academic freedom does not
lead to the conclusion that constitutional protection for academic freedom
should not still extend to individual professors against trustees, administrators,
and faculty peers.' More accurately, the Supreme Court's recognition of
(providing example of recent Supreme Court decision involving institutional academic free-
dom). The University of Pennsylvania case involved a denial of tenure to Associate Professor
Rosalie Tung despite favorable recommendations by the majority of her. faculty colleagues.
University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 185. "Professor Tung filed charges with the EEOC
alleging that the school discriminated against her on the basis of race, sex, and national origin,
in violation of Title VII." Id. Pursuant to its investigation of Tung's charges, the EEOC
requested relevant tenure review files by subpoena, which the district court ordered and the
Third Circuit affirmed. Id. at 186-87. The university appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting
"a First Amendment right of 'academic freedom' against wholesale disclosure of the contested
documents." Id. at 188. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Blackmun, the Court found
the University's academic freedom claim "misplaced" and affirmed the enforcement of the
district court's subpoena. Id. at 197-02. Although the opinion did not specifically address the
University's claim that it enjoyed First Amendment academic freedom rights, the Court did
quote Ewing to the effect that courts "should show great respect for the faculty's professional
judgment." Id. at 199 (quoting Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225).
128. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
129. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12 (recognizing institutional academic freedom); see
also Rabban, supra note 28, at 256-80 (detailing development of institutional academic freedom
under First Amendment).
130. See Byrne, supra note 2, at 255, 257, 313 (arguing that courts are not equipped to
enforce traditional claims of academic freedom by professors against university decision-
makers); Metzger, supra note 3, at 1267, 1322 (concluding that professional and constitutional
definitions of academic freedom are "seriously incompatible and probably irreconcilable").
According to these commentators, the traditional nonlegal conception of academic freedom as
a right of individual faculty members, identified by the 1915 Declaration and widely accepted
in the scholarly world, lacks constitutional protection. Id. Similarly, in Urofsky v. Gilnore, a
majority of the Fourth Circuit claimed that the Supreme Court recognized only institutional
academic freedom. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 412 (4th Cir. 2000) (en bane), cert
denied, 531 U.S. 1070 (2001).
131. See Rabban, supra note 28, at 270 (asserting that academic freedom as right of
individual faculty members has constitutional protection). Professor Rabban argues that the
Supreme Court has "clearly recognized [constitutional academic freedom] as an unenumerated
first amendment right with both individual and institutional components that can be in tension
with each other." Id. at 300.
Various lower court cases have addressed directly the tension between institutional and
academic freedom while adjudicating disputes between individual faculty members and univer-
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The cases considered thus far suggest that the doctrine of academic
freedom is grounded firmly on constitutional premises and that individual
academic freedom continues to enjoy favored status under the First Amend-
ment.133 The Supreme Court recognized First Amendment academic freedom
as protecting academic speech - or more specifically, the professor's freedom
'to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understand-
ing."034 Nevertheless, in a more recent line of cases unrelated to academic
freedom per se, the Court has restricted the free speech rights of public
employees, in some instances including teachers.13  However, these restric-
sities. See, e.g., Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. CoIl., 759 F.2d 625, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1985) (assuming
that university administration could not completely forbid chair of art department from display-
ing his stained-glass windows on campus); Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802, 812-13 (E.D.
Ark. 1979) (involving dismissal of Marxist professor). In Cooper, a federal district judge
identified "a fundamental tension between the academic freedom of the individual teacher to be
free of restraints from the university administration, and the academic freedom of the university
to be free of government, including judicial, interference." Cooper, 472 F. Supp. at 813. In
Piarowsk, Judge Posner observed that academic freedom is used, "[T]O denote both the
freedom of the academy to pursue its ends without interference from the goverment... and
the freedom of the individual teacher... to pursue his ends without interference from the
academy, and these two freedoms are in conflict, as in this case." Piarowski, 759 F.2d at 629.
132. See Rabban, supra note 28, at 300 (stating that "[a]lthough the meaning of constitu-
tional academic freedom remains ambiguous, the Supreme Court has clearly recognized it as
an unenumerated first amendment right with both individual and institutional components that
can be in tension with each other"). Professor Rabban also insightfully comments:
Individual and institutional academic freedom provide protection for professors and
universities against the state. But when a professor asks a court to adjudicate a
claim that a university violated his constitutional or contractual academic freedom,
the university may respond that judicial resolution of the professor's claim would
constitute state intervention in university affairs and thereby infringe the univer-
sity's own academic freedom.
Id. Professor Rabban believes that "while it makes sense to derive institutional academic
freedom from the same value of independent critical inquiry that underlies individual academic
freedom... it perverts the first amendment and the concept of a bill of rights to subordinate
individual academic freedom to broad institutional autonomy from judicial review." Id. For
example, "legal cases and reports of AAUP investigating committees provide ample evidence
that, even if the 'dark age of faculty dependence' has ended... university violations of faculty
academic freedom continue to occur." Id. at 284.
133. See supra notes 74-132 and accompanying text (analyzing doctrine of academic free-
dom).
134. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
135. See infra Part IV (chronicling Supreme Court public employee free speech jurispru-
dence).
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tions have not explicitly overturned the Court's classic academic freedom
decisions. Instead, decisions such as Sweezy, Keyishian, and Ewing remain
good law.136 It remains unclear how the Court's commitment to the doctrine
of academic freedom that it once described as being "of transcendent value to
all of us" will survive in light of its recent curtailment of public employees'
freedom of speech.' 7
IV The Public Employee Free Speech Cases
Although academic freedom was constitutionalized as a "special concern
of the First Amendment" in the 1950s, the Supreme Court did not deal specifi-
cally with First Amendment speech rights of public employees until 1968.13
In subsequent years, the Court developed two distinct lines of cases: one
protecting acadenic freedom in public colleges and universities and the other
involving the speech rights of public school teachers and public employees in
other work contexts. 39 Significantly, the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on
whether the severely restrictive standards developed in the public employee
cases also apply to academic free speech.
Public employees traditionally had no free speech rights." Former Mass-
achusetts Supreme Court Justice Holmes's 1892 pronouncement about a
policeman's rights reflects the traditional view: "[H]e may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
man. 0 41 The Supreme Court retreated from this broad position in 1968, but in
subsequent cases, it has narrowly delimited government employees' free
speech rights. 42 In deciding these cases, the Court has focused on the nature
136. See supra Part II.B (describing Supreme Court's identification of academic freedom
as unenumerated First Amendment right).
137. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967).
138. See supra Part MI.A-B (discussing Supreme Court's recognition of academic freedom
as "special concern" of First Amendment); see also infra note 145 and accompanying text
(detailing facts of Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
139. See generally Hiers, supra note 102, at 217 (1995) (reviewing academic freedom and
public employment decisions of Supreme Court).
140. See Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 83 (explaining that employers were not constitu-
tionay restrained from requiring, as condition of public employment, that employee suspend
his freedom of speech, as long as employee had notice of condition prior to accepting employ-
ment).
141. McAuliffv. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). The Supreme
Court supported Justice Homes' view as expressed in Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S.
485, 492 (1952): "[Teachers] have no right to work for the State in the school system on their
own terms .... If they do not choose to work on [the system's] terms, they are at liberty to
retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere." See supra Part liA (discussing Adler).
142. See infra Part IVA (discussing Supreme Court decisions concerning free speech
rights of government employees). See generally Hier, supra note 3, at 21 (detailing Supreme
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of the speech in question and not on the nature of the job performed by the
employee in question.
143
A. Supreme Court Decisions
1. The Pickering Balancing Test
In Pickering v. Board of Education,'4 the Supreme Court held for the
first time that public employees do not forsake their First Amendment rights
as a condition of government employment.1 4' The local school board dis-
missed Marvin Pickering, a high school teacher, for writing a letter to a local
newspaper that criticized the way the board and school administrators handled
school revenue bond proposals. 46  Before firing him, the board granted
Pickering a hearing in which it ultimately found that Pickering's published
statements unjustly questioned the motives, responsibility, and competence of
both the board and the school administration.14' The board also found that
Pickering's statements were "disruptive of faculty discipline," and generated
"controversy, conflict and dissension among teachers, administrators, the
Board of Education, and the residents of the district."'"Without mentioning academic freedom per se, the Court cited Wieman
and Keyishian to state that teachers may not "be compelled to relinquish the
First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment
on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the public
schools in which they work.' 49 However, Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court case law that "so limits the prospects for vindicating the speech rights of government
employees as to justify classifying such rights as endangered species").
143. See infra Part IVA (detailing Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning public em-
ployee free speech).
144. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
145. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 563 (1968). In Pickering, a public school
teacher sued the school district, claiming that his dismissal for writing a letter to a local newspa-
per criticizing a bond proposal and tax increase to raise school revenue violated his right to free
speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 564-65. The school system claimed
that the information in Pickering's letter was erroneous and that Pickering's letter was detrimen-
tal to the efficient operation and administration of the schools in the district. Id. at 564-67. The
Court declared that the test to determine whether the free speech rights of a public employee will
be protected hinges on the balance between the public employee's First Amendment interests in
speech and the government's interest in efficiency. Id. at 568. The Pickering Court held that a
public employee's exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish
the basis for his dismissal from public employment. Id. at 574. Thus, the Pickering Court
concluded that Pickering's dismissal violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 575.
146. Id. at 564.
147. Id. at 567.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 568; see supra notes 93-98, 109-19 and accompanying text (discussing Wieman
and Keyishian).
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majority, also noted, "[The State has interests as an employer in regulating
the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in
connection with regulation of the speech of its citizenry in general."'' 50 He
then set out the Pickering "balancing formula":
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees."'
Although the Court refused to establish a specific standard by which to
measure all speech by public employees, the Court did discuss general lines
of analysis to determine the controlling interests. 5 2 In examining the contents
of Pickering's letter, the Court found that the statements in no way were
directed toward any person with whom Pickering would come into contact in
the course of his daily work."' The Court also stated that the statements
presented no question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors
or harmony among coworkers.
5 4
The school board argued that although Pickering's comments involved
matters of public concern, the letter could offer a basis for dismissal on the
grounds that the comments were critical.' The Court rejected that argument
even though the Court noted that a few of Pickering's statements were false.' 6
Instead, the Court declared that the statements deserved protection because
there was no evidence of either disruption in the day-to-day operations of the
school or the potential to cause conflict among the members of the board,
150. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 569.
153. Id. at 569-70.
154. Id. at 569-74. The Court stated that Pickering's letter dealt with "the question
whether a school system requires additional funds." Id. at 571. This, the Court said, was a
"matter of legitimate public concern" because as to this question, "free and open debate is vital
to informed decision-making by the electorate." Id. at 571-72. Subsequent to finding that the
subject matter of Pickering's public communication was related only marginally to his employ-
ment, the Court concluded that "it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the
general public he seeks to be." Id. at 574.
155. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-72.
156. Id. at 573. Pickering encompassed an additional element in that Pickering's letter
contained allegedly false charges. Id. at 566. Because of this, at least part of the Court's ruling
in favor of Pickering was tied to an application of the libel standard of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. See id. at 574 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
The New York Times Court held that a State cannot authorize the recovery of damages by a
public official for defamatory statements directed at him except when such statements are shown
to have been made either with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of their
falsity. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964).
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teachers, administrators, or residents of the district.' Because Pickering's
speech did not constitute workplace disruption, the Court concluded that the
school board's interest in limiting the teacher's opportunities to contribute to
public debate was not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a
similar contribution by any member of the general public."5 8
Although the public employee in Pickering was a teacher, the Court
found his employment status was only "tangentially and insubstantially"
involved in the subject matter of his commumication.15 9 Thus, Pickering had
nothing to do with the doctrine of academic freedom and everything to do
with the regulation of disruptive public employee speech generally." ° The
Supreme Court left academic freedom in the sense of freedom of scholarly
inquiry untouched.
2. The Connick Two-Step Analysis
In Connlckv. Myers,' the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether
Pickering protected a public employee from being discharged for speech
concerning internal office affairs. Sheila Myers, an assistant district attorney,
brought an action against her superior, district attorney Harry Connick, claim-
ing that he wrongfully terminated her due to her exercise of free speech
rights. 62 After Connick arranged to transfer her to a different section of crim-
157. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968). The Pickering Court
distinguished between two fundamentally different public employee speech cases by stating the
following:
What we do have before us is a case in which a teacher has made erroneous public
statements upon issues then currently the subject of public attention, which are
critical of his ultimate employer but which are neither shown nor can be presumed
to have in any way either impeded the teachers proper performance of his daily
duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of schools
generally.
Id. In a footnote, the Court also noted that Picketing did not present a situation in which "a
teacher's public statements are so without foundation as to call into question his fitness to
perform his duties in the classroom." Id. at 573 n.5. In such a case, the Court indicated that the
statements would "merely be evidence of the teacher's general competence, or lack thereof, and
not an independent basis for dismissal." Id.
158. Id. at574.
159. Id. The Court also indicated that "statements by public officials on matters of public
concern must be accorded First Amendment protection despite the fact that the statements are
directed at their nominal superiors." Id.
160. See id. (distinguishing between public employee speech commenting on matter of
public concern that is disruptive and public employee speech commenting on matter of public
concern that is non-disruptive).
161. 461 U.S.138 (1983).
162. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983). In Connick, the Supreme Court
considered the issue of whether Pickering protected a public employee from being discharged
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inal court, Myers expressed her opposition to the transfer and then circulated
a questionnaire among fellow assistant attorneys to ascertain their views. 63
Shortly thereafter, Connick fired Myers for her insubordination and for her
refusal to accept the transfer.'" The district court held that the First Amend-
ment protected Myers's questionnaire and that her firing was illegal under
Pickering because Myers's speech was on "matters of public concern."'65
After an analysis of Pickering and a variety of other cases involving pub-
lic employee speech, the Supreme Court upheld the district attorney's ac-
tions.'" The majority concluded that the assistant prosecutor's speech was
not on a matter of public concern and that, consequently, it was "unnecessary
for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge."'" The holding specifically
established that as a threshold manner, public employee speech must be of
public concern or relate to a political, social, or community concern to qualify
for First Amendment protection.'" Furthermore, the Court asserted that fed-
eral courts are not the proper places to "review the wisdom of a personnel
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's
behavior.
169
Aside from reinforcing the public employer's right to maintain discipline
and efficiency in the workplace, the Court expressed its desire to refrain from
turning personnel matters into constitutional issues, saying "the First Amend-
ment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee
complaints over internal office affairs."' 70 The Court applied the Pickering
balancing test to the portion of the questionnaire that related to a matter of
for speech concerning internal office affairs. Id. at 140. Myers, an assistant district attorney,
was scheduled for a transfer to a different section of the criminal court. Id. Myers expressed
her opposition to the transer to her supervisors and circulated a questionnaire concerning the
offer transfer policy and other office policies. Id. at 140-41. The Connick Court established
that as a threshold matter, public employee speech must be of a public concern or relate to any
political, social, or community concern to qualify for First Amendment protection. Id. at 146.
The Connick Court further explained that courts must look to the form, content, and context of
a statement to determine whether the speech addresses matters of public concern or personal
interest Id. at 147-48. The Conrnick Court concluded that the state's interest outweighed
Myers's interest in her speech because her speech threatened to interfere with the efficient
operation of the workplace. Id. at 150-54. Therefore, the Connick Court upheld the firing of
Myers for the reasonable belief that the speech would disrupt the office, undermine the em-
ployer's authority, and destroy close working relationships. Id. at 154.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 142 (describing district court's holding).
166. Id. at 153-54.
167. Id. at 146.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 147.
170. Id. at 149.
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public concernm ' It then weighed Myers's interest in her speech against the
State's interest in preventing potentially disruptive speech." 2 The Court found
that the district attorney was justified in firing Myers because the State's
interest outweighed Myers's interest in her speech, as her speech threatened to
interfere with the efficient operation of the workplace.173 The Court also
recognized that while the primary purpose of the First Amendment is the full
protection of speech on issues of public concern, this right must be balanced
with the practical reality involved in operating a government office.1 4
Connick modified the Pickering balancing test in two important ways.
First, the Court stated that as a threshold matter, the speech in question must
be on a matter of public concern.175 If the speech is not on a matter of public
concern, a court is not required to balance the competing interests. 176 Second,
a court must balance the interest a public employee has in her speech against
the employer's interest in preventing actual or potential disruption in the
workplace.177  At the core of the public concern inquiry are questions of
"content, form, and context."' 178 Thus, although status and job-relatedness are
often factors to be applied in the balancing test, they are not conclusive.
179
171. See id. at 150-54 (applying Pickering balancing test). The question that the Court
found related to a matter of public concern was the question that asked whether the attorneys
in the office "ever felt pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported
candidates." Id. at 149.
172. See id. at 152 ("[W]e do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to
unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships
is manifest before taking action.").
173. Id. at 153-54.
174. Id. at 154.
175. Id. at 146.
176. See id. (setting out two-part test).
177. See id. at 152 (cautioning that "a stronger showing [by the employer] may be neces-
sary if the employee's speech more substantially involved matters of public concern"). In
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987), the Supreme Court seemed to draw back from its
position in Connick that potential disruption was sufficient to outweigh a public employee's free
speech interest In Rankin, a data entry clerk, McPherson heard about an attempt on the
President's life and commented, "If they go for him again, I hope they get him." Id. at 380-81.
McPherson's supervisor fired her for the remark. Id. at 381-82.
After finding that McPherson's speech addressed a matter of public concern, the Court
found no evidence that her comments actually interfered with or disrupted the workplace. Id.
at 388-89. The Court held that the employer's interest in firing McPherson did not exceed
McPherson's First Amendment rights. Id. at 392. In contrast to Connick, Rankin seemed to
require a showing of actual disruption to agency operations rather than abstract showings of
threatened disruption to discipline, authority, or working relationships. See Hiers, supra note
102, at 241-42 (comparing Connick to Rankin).
178. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,14748 (1983).
179. See, e.g., Arvinger v. Mayor of Baltimore, 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating
that "[a]lthough the Connick court did not elaborate on the relative weight to be accorded these
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3. Waters v. Churchill: Another Level
In 1994, in Waters v. Churchill,'" the United States Supreme Court again
dealt with public employee speech in the workplace.'' In an attempt to pro-
tect against the employer's ability to avoid constitutional scrutiny by a mere
invocation of "disruption," a plurality of the Court created a new procedural
requirement to the Pickering-Connick balancing test." 2 The plurality held
three factors, this court has held that 'content, subject-matter, is always the central aspect'")
(quoting Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 720 (4th Cir. 1988)); Piver v. Pender County Bd. of
Educ., 835 F.2d 1076, 1080 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding that role of speaker does not control public
concern analysis); Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 999 (4th Cir. 1985) (focusing on public
importance of speech).
180. 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (plurality opinion).
181. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (plurality opinion). In Waters, the Supreme
Court confronted a situation in which a nurse had been discharged from a government hospital
for her speech to another nurse on a certain day. Id. at 664-66. Several persons working at the
hospital reported conflicting stories concerning the nature of the discharged nurse's speech, Id.
The Court of Appeals held that the government only could fire the employee for her speech if
her speech, in fact, was such that it was not protected by the First Amendment Id. at 667-68.
The Supreme Court, by a seven to two vote but without a majority opinion, overruled the Court
of Appeals, but remanded for further findings on whether the employee actually was fired
because of disruptive statements or because of nondisruptive statements. Id. at 680-82. Justice
O'Connor, writing for the plurality, suggested no fixed set of procedures that the government
must follow in determining the facts concerning an employee's speech before discharging the
employee. Id. at 672-74. However, the Waters Court required the government employer to act
"reasonably" in attempting to determine the facts concerning an employee's speech before the
government fired the employee for that speech. Id. at 677-78. Thus, the Waters Court stated
that under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, a public employer who reasonably
believes a third-party report that an employee engaged in constitutionally unprotected speech
may punish the employee in reliance on that report, even if it turns out that the employee's
actual remarks were constitutionally protected. Id. at 678-79.
182. See id. at 677 (stating that employer decision-making will not be "unduly burdened"
by having courts look to facts as employer reasonably found them to be). Some commentators
heralded Waters as a boon to employees because it set up the first procedural safeguard for an
employee's right to free speech. See, e.g., D. Keith Fortaer, Note, Public Employers Must
Conduct a Reasonable Investigation to Determine if an Employee 'sSpeech is ProtectedBefore
Discharging the Employee Based Upon the Speech, 18 U. ARK. Lrrnr ROCK L. J. 463,467-77
(1996) (expressing cautious optimism regarding Water's procedural rights); Keith L. Sachs,
Comment, Waters v. Churchill: Personal Grievance or Protected Speech, Only a Reasonable
Investigation Can Tell - The Termination ofAt-Will Government Employees, 30 NEw ENO. L.
REV. 779, 781 (1996) (describing Water's "safeguard"). The Waters Court itself suggested this
interpretation: "A speaker is more protected if she has two opportunities to be vindicated - first
by the employer's investigation and then by the jury - than just one." Waters, 511 U.S. at 570
(plurality opinion). But see Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Work-
place, 71 ID. L.J. 101, 128 (1995) ("Waters v. Churchill adds little or nothing to the First
Amendment protection of at-will public employees."); Rachel E. Fugate, Choppy Waters are
Forecastfor Academic Free Speech, 26 FIA. ST. U. L. REv. 187,208 (1998) ("Waters severely
limited public employee free speech doctrine by replacing a genuine balancing approach with
a standard that allows an employer itself to determine if speech is protected.").
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that before a public employee can be discharged for unprotected speech, the
employer must undertake a reasonable investigation to evaluate the content of
the speech.
183
Waters involved the termination of a nurse, Cheryl Churchill, from a
public hospital for her negative comments regarding the hospital's adminis-
tration and practices.'" Churchill's employer contended that her comments
were disruptive. 5" However, Churchill alleged that the conversation involved
only nondisruptive statements about hospital policy with which she dis-
agreed.5 6 Churchill sued in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that in firing her, defendants violated her First Amendment right to
free speech.
18 7
In district court, the hospital won a partial grant of smmary judgment9
8
The district court held that regardless of which version of Churchill's com-
ments was correct, the speech was not about a matter of public concern and
therefore was not protected. 9 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court, holding that Churchill's version of her comments
did qualify as speech on a matter of public concern and thus was protected
under Connick.190
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and
remanded the case to determine whether Churchill's dismissal was due to her
statements or to some other reason."' Justice O'Connor, writing for the
plurality, began by stating that the government as employer has broader
powers in censoring speech than does the government as sovereign in restrict-
ing the speech of everyday citizens." The Court found that this additional
power derives from the interest the government as employer has in carrying
out an assigned task both effectively and efficiently.'93 Thus, the "govern-
ment's interest in achieving its goals as effectively and as efficiently as
183. Waters, 511 U.S. at 677-78 (plurality opinion).
184. Id. at 664-66 (plurality opinion). Churchill received a negative evaluation from her
supervisors that indicated that Churchill "promote[d] an unpleasant atmosphere and hinders
constructive communication and cooperation." Id. at 665 (plurality opinion) (internal citation
omitted).
185. Id. at 665-66 (plurality opinion).
186. See id. at 667 (plurality opinion) (noting that Seventh Circuit found that Churchill's
speech was not disruptive).
187. Churchill v. Waters, 731 F. Supp. 311,312 (C.D. I. 1990).
188. Id. at321-22.
189. Id.
190. Waters v. Churchill, 977 F.2d 1114,1129 (7th Cir. 1992).
191. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 682 (1994) (plurality opinion).
192. Id. at671.
193. Id.
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possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as
sovereign to a significant interest when it acts as employer."'
However, the Court placed theburden on the public employer to conduct
a reasonable investigation to determine whether the employee's speech meets
the Pickering-Connick test and is therefore entitled to First Amendment
protection.195 The Court stated that for the employer's actions to be consid-
ered reasonable, the employer must have acted in good faith, but good faith
alone is not sufficient.196 Thus, the Court concluded that a reasonable fact-
finder could have found that Churchill was fired not because of her disruptive
comments to other employees, but because of her nondisruptive criticism of
her employer."g In light of these reservations regarding the hospital's true
motive, the Court remanded the case for a determination of which of Chur-
chill's statements were actually the basis for her dismissal.'"
4. NTEU
The Supreme Court again examined the relationship between public
employee speech and the speaker's employment duties in United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union [hereinafter NTEU].'" In NTEU, gov-
194. Id at 675. The Court also acknowledged that the employer's reliance on hearsay,
personal knowledge of the employee, credibility of the witness, and other factors that the
judicial process ignores, may sometimes be the most effective way for the employer "to avoid
further recurrences of improper and disruptive conduct" Id. at 676.
195. Id. at 677.
196. Id. The plurality announced, "[ilt is necessary that the decisionmaker reach its
conclusion about what was said in good faith, rather than as a pretext; but it does not follow that
good faith is sufficient." Id. The Court added, "[o~nly procedures outside the range of what a
reasonable manager would use may be condemned as unreasonable." Id. at 678.
197. Id at 681-82. The Court referred to Churchill's previous criticisms of the cross-
traing policy, management's sensitivity to the criticisms, and hostilities directed at Churchill
as other possible motivating factors for her dismissal. Id.
198. Id. at682.
199. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995). In NTEU,
the Supreme Court considered a challenge by two unions and several career civil servants to
invalidate § 501(b) of the Ethics in Government Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(b) (1988), which
broadly prevented federal employees from accepting any compensation for making speeches or
writing articles, even if the subject of the speech or article had no connection with the em-
ployee's official duties. Id. at 457-62. The NTEU Court observed that the statute represented
a wholesale deterrent to a broad category of expression by a massive number of potential
speakers, and therefore gave rise to far more serious concerns than could any single supervisory
decision, such as the one at issue in Pickering. Id. at 468. Hence, the NTEU Court concluded
that the "Government must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group
of present and future employees in a broad range of present and future expression are out-
weighed by that expression's necessary impact on the actual operation of the Government" Id.
(internal citation omitted). In addition, the NTEU Court observed that a blanket burden on the
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ernment employees brought suit because the Ethics in Government Act
prohibited them from accepting honorariums for public speaking engagements
unrelated to their jobs. 200 The Court viewed the employees as citizens whose
expressive activity fell within the protected category of citizen comment
rather than within the category of employee comment on matters related to
personal status in the workplace.2 ' The Court also determined that the govern-
ment's burden was especially great because the Ethics in Government Act2°2
established a prospective deterrent "to a broad category of expression by a
massive number of potential speakers."2 3
In addition, the Court recognized a difference between "adverse action
taken in response to actual speech" and an up-front restriction like that found
in the Act which "chills potential speech before it happens." 4 Justice Ste-
vens's majority opinion noted that the prospective restrictions on public
employee speech impact heavily "on the public's right to read and hear what
the employees would otherwise have written and said."202 The Court found
that the public's interest in receiving the speech of government employees
must, however, be weighed against the government's interest in a challenged
restriction.206 Thus, the Court modified the Pickering test in favor of public
speech of nearly 1.7 million federal employees requires a much stronger justification than one
of administrative convenience. Id. at 474. The NTEU Court concluded that the speculative
benefits of the honoraria ban were not sufficient to justify its crudely crafted burden on the
federal employees' freedom to engage in expressive activity. Id. at 477. Thus, the NTEU Court
held that the honoraria ban violated the First Amendment as applied to the employees who were
party to the action. Id. at 477-78. In light of the Supreme Court's obligation to avoid judicial
legislation and its inability to identify correctly the exact terms of any nexus requirement that
Congress would have adopted in a more limited honoraria ban, the NTEU Court refused to
modify the remedy by crafting a nexus requirement for the honoraria ban. Id. at 478-79.
200. See id. at 459 (challenging constitutionality of Ethics in Government Act). Congress
passed the Ethics in Government Act in 1989. Id. Among other provisions, the Act denied
employees of the executive branch honoraria or other compensation when giving speeches. Id.
For instance, one of the plaintiffs was a postal worker who occasionally gave lectures pertaining
to the Quaker religion. Id. at 461. Another plaintiff was employed as an engineer, yet gave
lectures on black history. Id.
201. Id. at466.
202. 15 U.S.C. app. § 504 (1988 ed., Supp. V).
203. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 467. The NTEU Court recognized that such a restriction "gives
rise to far more serious concerns than could any single supervisory decision." Id. at 468.
204. Id. at 468 (citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)).
205. Id. at 470 (citing Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976)). The Court then observed that while it has no way to measure the true
cost of the burden on the public's right to read and hear what the employees would have written
and said, it "cannot ignore the risk that it might deprive us of the work of a future Melville or
Hawthorne." Id.
206. Id. at 470-73.
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employees by stating that when the government broadly restricts public
employee speech, it has the burden of establishing that "the interests of both
potential audiences and a vast group of present and future employees in a
broad range of present and future expression are outweighed by that expres-
sion's 'necessary impact on the actual operation' of the Government."2'
Applying this test, the Court concluded that the restriction imposed an uncon-
stitutional burden on the free speech rights of federal employees.' s
B. Summary
From Pickering and its progeny, the Supreme Court has synthesized a
multi-faceted test for lower courts to apply to public employee free speech
cases involving disciplinary actions taken against individual employees. First,
a court must determine if an employee's speech relates to a matter of public
concern.' If it does, a court must then balance the interests of the employee,
as a citizen speaking on matters of public concern, with the interests of the
government, as an employer efficiently performing public services through its
employees."' This balancing test applies equally to speech within and outside
the workplace. 211 However, when a case involves regulations proscribing a
broad category of speech by a large number of potential speakers, the govern-
ment must show that the interests of the potential audience's present and
future expression outweigh that expression's necessary impact on the actual
operation of the government.
212
207. Id. at 468 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968)).
208. Id.
209. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (stating that, as threshold matter, speech
in question must be on matter of public concern). In other words, speech of public employees
on matters of merely private concern such as personal employment grievances is unprotected.
Id. at 147-49. Speech involves a matter of public concern when it affects a social, political, or
other interest of a community. Id. at 146. To determine whether speech involves a matter of
public concern, a court must examine the content, context, and form of the speech at issue in
light of the entire record. Id. at 147-48.
210. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Furthermore, before a public
employee can be discharged for unprotected speech, the employer also must undertake a rea-
sonable investigation to evaluate the content of the speech. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S.
661, 667-73 (1994) (plurality opinion) (adding procedural requirement to Pickering-Connick
test).
211. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987) (finding that Pickering-Connick
balancing test applies to employee's on-the-job statements).
212. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1995)
(stating that government's burden is greater with respect to statutory restrictions on expression
than with respect to isolated disciplinary action).
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V Public Employee Speech Cases Applied in an Academic Setting:
Urofsky v. Gilmore
The Supreme Court has recognized academic freedom as a special con-
cern of the First Amendment." 3 The Court also has provided standards to
clarify the permissible scope of public speech by all government employees.2" 4
Nevertheless, the Court has never defined precisely the relationship between
the protection of academic freedom and the regulation of public employee
speech.
The confusion wrought by Pickering and its progeny is best illustrated
by an examination of the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Urofsky v.
Gilmore.215 In Urofsky, the Fourth Circuit found that the Pickering-Connick
balancing test provided the appropriate standard for determining whether a
professor's Internet research, writing, and communications deserved First
Amendment protection.216 A professor is not a typical public employee,
however, and courts should not apply the synthesized public employee doc-
trine to the academic speech of public university professors.217
A. The Factual History
On July 1, 1996, a Virginia statute that restricted state employees' access
to constitutionally protected speech became effective.1 ' The Virginia law,
entitled "Restrictions on State Employee Access to Information Infrastruc-
ture," made it a criminal offense for any state employee to use state-owned or
state-leased computer equipment "to access, download, print or store any
213. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("Our Nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and
not merely to the teachers concerned."); see also supra Part I.B (discussing Supreme Court's
recognition of doctrine of"academic freedom").
214. See supra Part IVA (chronicling Supreme Court public employee free speech juris-
prudence).
215. 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1070(2001).
216. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d at 406-09 (applying Pickering-Connick balancing
test to speech protected under doctrine of academic freedom); see also infra notes 218-353 and
accompanying text (discussing Urofky).
217. See infra Part VI (discussing inapplicability of Pickering-Connick balancing test to
speech protected under doctrine of academic freedom).
218. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-805 (Michie Supp. 1998), amended by § 8.1-805 (Michie
Supp. 1999), recodified at § 2.2-2827 (2001) ("Restrictions on State Employee Access to
Information Infrastructure"). The Virginia General Assembly passed the Restrictions on State
Employees Access to Information Infrastructure Act in 1996. In 1999, however, the Assembly
amended the Act to reflect changes in the definition of "sexually explicit content." See infra
note 221 (describing Assembly's changes in response to Urofsky lawsuit). In 2001, the Assem-
bly renumbered all of Virginia's statutes, thereby recodifying the Act at § 2.2-2827 (2001).
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information infrastructure files or services having sexually explicit content"
without first obtaining written approval.21 9 Under the Act, only the heads of
state agencies could give this approval "to the extent required in conjunction
with a bona fide, agency-approved research project or other agency approved
undertaking."'220 The Act defined "sexually explicit content" to include any
description or visual representation of "a lewd exhibition of nudity... sexual
excitement, [or] sexual conduct," and it defined "information infrastructure"
so broadly as to encompass all "telecommunications, cable, and computer
networks," including "the Internet, the World Wide Web, Usernet, bulletin
board systems, on-line systems, and telephone networks."'"
The Urofsky plaintiffs, a group of professors at Virginia state colleges
and universities, challenged the constitutionality of these restrictions, alleging
that it interfered with their academic freedom to research and teach.' The
lead plaintiff, Melvin Urofsky, claimed that the Act prohibited him from
publishing an Internet site containing materials on gender roles and
sexuality.'22 Urofsky also asserted that the Act precluded him from assigning
certain projects on indecency law to his students, due to his inability to check
their work for fear that doing so would cause him to violate the Act.224 A
second plaintiff, Paul Smith, similarly claimed that the Act interfered with his
research and teaching, and thereby violated his First Amendment rights.22 In
219. VA. CODEANN. § 8.1-805 (Michie Supp. 1998), amended by § 8.1-805 (Mfichie Supp.
1999), recodified at § 2.2827B (2001). The Act only exempted employees of the Department
of State Police from this prohibition. Id. § 8.1-804 (Michie Supp. 1998).
220. Id. § 8.1-805 (Michie Supp. 1998).
221. Id. § 2.1-804 (Michie Supp. 1998) (defining "sexually explicit" and "information
infrastructure" when Urofsky district court ruled and when panel of Fourth Circuit initially con-
sidered Urofsky appeal). However, following the Urofsky panel decision, the Virginia General
Assembly amended the definition of "sexually explicit content" to add the following italicized
language:
content having as a dominant theme (i) lascivious description of or (ii) any lascivi-
ous picture, photograph, drawing, motion picture film, digital image or similar
visual representation depicting sexual bestiality, a lewd exhibition of nudity, as
nudity is defined in § 18.2-390, sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sadomaso-
chistic abuse, as also defined in § 18.2-390, coprophilia, urophilia, or fetishism.
Id. § 2.1-804 (Michie Supp. 1999), recodified at § 2.2-2827 (2001) (emphasis added).
222. See Uroficsy v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634, 635 (E.D. Va. 1998) (stating that plaintiffs
alleged that Act unconstitutionally interfered with their research and teaching).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See id. (stating that Smith's website containing material on gender roles and sexuality
was censored as result of Act). Additionally, Terry Meyers was concerned about his ability to
access the Commonwealth's own database of sexually explicit poetry to continue his studies on
the "fleshy school" of Victorian poets; Dana Heller stopped using the Internet to continue her
research on lesbian and gay studies; and Bernard H. Levin and Bryan J. Delaney were reluctant
to continue their psychological research on human sexual experience. Id.
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response, the state argued that the Act's restrictions were necessary to main-
tain efficiency in the public workplace and to prevent the creation of sexually-
hostile work environments.
226
B. The District Court's Analysis of Urofsky
In Urofsky, the federal district court struck down the Virginia Act as an
unconstitutional abridgment of First Amendment rights. 22 17 The district court
based its analysis of the free speech issue on the Pickering-Connick balancing
test because "[w]hen government employees speak out on matters of public
concern their speech is entitled to First Amendment protection. '229 The court
presumed that the plaintiffs' speech addressed matters of public concern
because the plaintiffs' research related to issues that could benefit the public." 9
The court found that the Act imposed a prospective deterrent "to a broad
category of expression by a massive number of potential speakers" because it
stifled "inquiry and debate by academics in the fields of art, literature, medi-
cine, psychology, anthropology, and law."23° The court also recognized the
right of the public to "receive and benefit from the speech of state employees
on matters within their areas of expertise. '231  Applying the constitutional
balancing test that the Supreme Court prescribed in NTEU for broad prior
restraints on public employee speech and noting that strict scrutiny is usually
required when a speech restriction discriminates on the basis of content, the
court concluded that Virginia's justifications for the Act did not outweigh the
226. Id. at 639.
227. See Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634, 643 (E.D. Va. 1998) (invalidating Act for
violating First and Fourteenth Amendments).
228. Id. at 636 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-72 (1968)). The court
also cited Connick v. Myers for the proposition that "speech of public employees on matters of
merely private concern such as personal employment grievances is unprotected." Id. (citing
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-49 (1983)).
229. Id. The court noted that, as in NTEU, the statute at issue impacted heavily "on the
public's right to read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said." Id.
at 638 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995)).
230. Id. at 638 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454,
467 (1997)).
231. Id. (citing United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 480
(1995); Sanjour v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). The court then explained, "Our
precedents have focused 'not only on the role of the First Amendment in fostering individual
self-expression but also on the role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas.'" Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866
(1982) (internal quotations omitted)). The court also stated that by targeting the use of comput-
ers, the Act necessarily restricted the use of the Internet - "arguably the most powerful tool for
sharing information ever developed." Id. (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997)).
In Reno, the Supreme Court noted that "[i]t is no exaggeration to conclude that the content of
the Internet is as diverse as human thought." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997).
WHO OWNS ACADEMIC FREEDOM?
interests of thousands of state employees and the public in expression on
sexually explicit topics."2
The district court noted that the Act was not narrowly tailored to the
Commonwealth's asserted interests in promoting workplace efficiency and
avoiding hostile work environment claims.2 33 The court found that the Act
ignored the "limitless variety of disruptive computer activities unrelated to
viewing sexually explicit material"" 4 and targeted only a "single medium,
electronic communication." 5 The court also observed that the "lack of fit"
between the government's interest and the sweep of its restrictions cast "'seri-
ous doubt' on the government's asserted need for the Act. "
236
Furthermore, the court found that the licensing scheme - which granted
unbridled discretion to administrators - lacked clear criteria, mandated public-
disclosure, invited arbitrary enforcement, and chilled the free exercise of
speech rights.3" In particular, the court determined that the public records
232. Urofsky, 993 F. Supp. at 643; see Urofsky Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 6 n.4
(stating that State's asserted concerns about workplace efficiency and prevention of sexually
hostile work environment were "not articulated by the legislature at the time of Act's passage,
but by the Commonwealth's attorneys during the litigation"). The Commonwealth relied on
DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 805 (4th Cir. 1995) and Boring v. Buncombe County Board
of Education, 136 F.3d 364, 368-69 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) to support its position that state
employee computer use is not protected speech under the First Amendment because the em-
ployees act in their capacities as government employees rather than as public citizens. Urofsky,
216 F.3d at 636. The district court did not find this argument persuasive because it noted that
DiMeglio, Boring, and Pickering all focused on whether "after-the-fact" discipline of a public
employee by a government employer violated the employee's First Amendment free speech
rights. Id. at 636-37. The court recognized that those cases did not involve a "content-based
prior restraint affecting thousands of government employees." Id. at 638.
233. See Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 638-40 (finding Act fatally over-inclusive and under-
inclusive).
234. Id. at 640. The court listed "accessing online video games, news services, stock
quotes and financial information, chat rooms, and shopping sites" as examples of disruptive
computer activities unrelated to viewing sexually explicit material. Id. The Act also did not
address the sending and receiving of e-mail on non-work-related topics. Id. Moreover, the
court found it strange that Virginia state police were exempt from the Act. Id. (citing Va. Code
Ann. § 2.1-804) (Michie Supp. 1998). The Commonwealth "did not explain why state police
were less susceptible to the temptations posed by sexually explicit material than doctors, social
workers, academics, lawyers and other state employees who are subject to the Act." Id.
235. Id. The court noted that the Act ignored verbal and printed material, which might
create a sexually hostile environment. Id.
236. Id. at 639 (citations omitted). Moreover, the court found that the harms asserted by
the State appeared to be addressed adequately by "existing content-neutral enforcement mech-
anisms," which further undercut the State's asserted justifications of the statute. Id. at 639-40
(citing RAy. v. City of St Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) ("The existence of adequate
content-neutral alternatives thus 'undercut[s] significantly' any defense of such a statute"
(quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988)))).
237. Id. at 641-42 (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750,763
(1988)). The court also cited Thornhillv. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,97 (1940): "It is not merely
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provision was "a not-so-veiled threat to the agency head who approves such
speech. '"I Moreover, the court stated that given the Act's strict qualifications
and the absence of clear criteria under which a department head may deter-
mine what is "required" and "bona fide," the Act placed unbridled discretion
in the hands of state administrators. 9 Consequently, the district court found
that the prior approval provision weighed heavily against the Commonwealth
in the Pickering-NTEU balancing test.
240
Finally, the district court noted that the state employees were already
subject to content-neutral policies and statutes that addressed the Common-
wealth's legitimate concerns.24' Given the over-inclusiveness and under-
inclusiveness of the Act and the existence of content-neutral alternatives, the
Act did not constitute a "reasonable response" to the Commonwealth's legiti-
mate interests under the Pickering-NTEU balancing test.242 Thus, the district
court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and invalidated the Act in
its entirety for violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
24 3
C. The Opinions of the Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit
1. The Three Judge Panel
On appeal by the Commonwealth, a three-judge panel reversed the
district court and upheld the Act without any constitutional scrutiny.244 Two
the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat in its very existence that
constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion." Id.
238. Id. at 641. Specifically, the Virginia Act provides that agency approvals of sexually
explicit speech "shall be available to the public under the provisions of the Virginia Freedom
ofInformation Act." VA. CoDE ANN. § 2.1-805 (Michie Supp. 1999), recodified at § 2.2-2827B
(2001).
239. Urofsky, 995 F. Supp. at 641.
240. Id. at 643.
241. Id. The district court also indicated that the Commonwealth's burden increased under
the Pickering-NTEU balancing test because the Act impermissibly discriminated against
sexually explicit content Id. The court stated, "[u]nderlying this principle is the recognition
that content based burdens on speech raise the specter that the government may effectively drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace." Id. at 637 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 106,116 (1991)).
242. Id. at 643. Although the court recognized that workplace efficiency and avoidance
of hostile work environment claims were important government interests, the court found that
the Act failed to advance those interests in a "direct and material way." Id. Thus, the court con-
cluded that the Commonwealth failed to satisfy the "heavy. burden" required of it under the
Pickering-NTEU balancing test Id.
243. Id. at 643-44.
244. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 167 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 1999). Originally, the plaintiffs
named George Allen, then Governor of Virginia, as the defendant. See Urofsky v. Allen, 995
F.Supp. 634, 635 (E.D.Va. 1998). Subsequently, James S. Gilmore, M was elected Governor
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of the three judges determined that there was no First Amendment protection
for state university professors in relation to their work-related research,
writing, or other communications.245 The panel's decision relied on the
proposition that the state, as an employer, "undoubtedly possesses greater
authority to restrict the speech of its employees than it has as sovereign to
restrict the speech of the citizenry as a whole.1
46
Judge Wilkins analyzed the PickerIng-Connick line of cases to determine
whether the state employees' right to access sexually explicit content on the
state-owned computers was speech involving a matter of public concern. 47
He recognized that speech involves a matter of public concern when it affects
a social or political interest of the community.24 Nevertheless, an inquiry into
whether a matter is of public concern "does not involve a determination of
how interesting or important the subject of an employee's speech is.v
2 49
Rather, the most important question for analysis is whether the speech at issue
was "made primarily in the [employee's] role as citizen or primarily in his role
as employee."Q
and was substituted as a party. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 167 F.3d 191, 193 n.1 (substituting
defendant Gilmore for defendant Allen). For "case of reference," the panel referred to Gilmore
as "the Commonwealth." Id.
245. See id. at 196 (holding that Act did not infringe upon First Amendment rights of state
employees).
246. Id. at 194 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,671-72 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(recognizing "that government as employer... has far broader powers than does government
as sovereign"); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (explaining "that the State
has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly
from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general")).
247. See id. at 194-96 (discussing Pickering-Connick line of cases pertaining to public
employee speech). The panel characterized its threshold inquiry as whether the Act regulated
"speech by employees of the Commonwealth in their capacity as citizens upon matters of public
concern." Id. at 195 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,146 (1983)). The panel pointed out
that there was no dispute concerning whether "speech" was at issue because First Amendment
protection of expression "encompasses the right to access information." Id. at 195 n.5 (citing
KIcindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 573,762 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,563 (1969)).
248. Id. at 195 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 146). To determine whether speech involves
a matter of public concern, the court examined the "content, context, and form of the speech at
issue in light of the entire record." Id. (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48).
249. Id. (citing Terrell v. Univ. of Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1362 (5th Cir. 1986)).
250. Urofsky, 167 F.3d at 196 (quoting Terrell, 792 F.2d at 1362). At this point in the
opinion, the panel also cited Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education, which held that
the discharge of a high school drama teacher as a result of her selection of a high school play
was not violative of the First Amendment because the choice of play did not involve a matter
of public concern, as the choice was made by the teacher in her capacity as a teacher in a matter
dealing with curriculum. Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 364-69 (4th
Cir. 1998) (en banc); see also infra notes 254-57 and accompanying text (discussing inapplica-
bility of Boring).
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Judge Wilkins's opinion then characterized the essence of the plaintiffs'
claim as an assertion that plaintiffs were entitled to access sexually explicit
material in their capacity as state employees. 5' This expansion of the issue
made it easy for him to conclude that because the plaintiffs only asserted an
"infringement on the manner in which they perform their work as state em-
ployees, they [could not] demonstrate that the speech to which they claim[ed]
entitlement would be made in their capacity as citizens speaking on matters
of public concern."" 2 Because the Act regulated the speech of individuals
speaking in their capacity as government employees and thus did not touch on
a matter of public concern, the panel concluded that "the speech [could] be
restricted consistent with the First Amendment.
253
The third member of the panel, Judge Hamilton, concurred separately.
He agreed with the result of the case but could not join in the analysis because
he believed that Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education,254 a case
involving curriculum choice by a high school teacher, dictated the majority's
result.255 Significantly, in Boring, Judge Hamilton dissented.25 6 Judge Hamil-
251. Urofsky, 167 F.3d at 196.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
255. Boring v. Buncome County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368-69 (4th. Cir. 1998)
(en bane). In Boring, the court ruled that Boring, a high school drama teacher, did not have a
First Amendment right to select and direct the play Independence as part of her curriculum. Id.
at 370. The play concerned a "dysfunctional, single-parent family - a divorced mother and
three daughters; one a lesbian, another pregnant with an illegitimate child." Id. at 366.
Although Independence won seventeen awards at a regional competition, a parent complained
about its content, and the school's principle subsequently banned its performance. Id. at 366-
67. The majority concluded that the school administrative authorities, not the teacher, has the
"right to fix the curriculum." Id. at 370; but see infra notes 289-93 and accompanying text
(describing Chief Judge Wilkinson's persuasive distinction between facts of Boring and facts
of Urofsky).
256. See id. at 374-75 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (joining Judge Metz's "persuasive dissent-
ing opinion"), Judge Motz stated that in her view, "the Connick framework does not provide
a workable formula for analyzing whether the First Amendment protects a teacher's in-class
speech (because] [n]either element of the Connick balancing test provides much assistance in
assessing whether this speech is entitled to constitutional protection." Id. at 378 (Motz, J., dis-
senting). Judge Motz recognized that the public concern element articulated in Connick "fails
to account adequately for the unique character of a teacher's in-class speech." Id. (Motz, J.,
dissenting). Judge Motz then stated the following:
When a teacher steps into the classroom she assumes a position of extraordinary
public trust and confidence: she is charged with educating our youth. Her speech
is neither ordinary employee workplace speech nor common public debate. Any
attempt to force it into either of these categories ignores the essence of teaching -
to educate, to enlighten, to inspire - and the importance of free speech to this most
critical endeavor. As the Supreme Court proclaimed more than forty years ago:
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ton stated that if he were "[1eft to [his] own devices," he "would hold that the
[pIlaintiffs' speech in this case is entitled to some measure of First Amend-
ment protection, thus triggering application of the Connick/Pickenng balanc-
ing test." 25
2. The En Banc Decision
a. Majority Opinion
Although petitioners obtained rehearing en banc, a majority ofthe Fourth
Circuit again reversed the district court in an 8-4 split decision.253 Judge
Wilkcins, writing for six of twelve judges, restated the panel majority's posi-
tion by denying state employees, including university teachers and scholars,
First Amendment protection in connection with their work. 9 For the major-
"Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate,
to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and
die."
Id. (Motz, J., dissenting) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)
(plurality opinion)). Judge Motz also observed that even if the Connick test did apply, the
speech in question was "obviously" of public concern. Id. (Motz, J., dissenting). For a more
general discussion of academic freedom and in-class speech, see, e.g., William G. Buss,
Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech: Communicating the Curriculum, 2 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 213 (1999) (discussing relationship between academic freedom, First Amend-
ment, and "communicating the curriculum"); Ramone C. Salomone, Free Speech and School
Governance in the Wake of Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REv. 253 (1992) (examining impact of
Hazelwood); Merle H. Weiner, Dirty Words in the Classroom: Teaching the Limits of the First
Amendment, 66 TENN. L. REV. 597 (1999) (analyzing whether teaching lesson is constitutionally
protected speech when focus is on teachers' profane or sex-related speech).
On its face, Boring easily can be distinguished from Urofy. See infra note 289-93 and
accompanying text (discussing part of Chief Judge Wilkinson's concurring opinion that
distinguished facts of Urofsky from facts of Boring). Academic freedom is arguably more
relevant in the university than in the context of secondary education. See id. Thus, the analysis
behind Judge Motz's dissent in Boring supports the theory that the Fourth Circuit misapplied
the Pickering-Connick balancing test to the academic inquiry and research at issue in Urofsky.
See infra Part VI.B (advocating removal of academic speech from Pickering-Connick test).
257. Urofsky, 167 F.3d at 197.
258. Urofky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,416 (4th Cir. 2000) (en bane), cert denied, 531
U.S. 1070 (2001). After the panel decision, the legislature narrowed the Act's definition of
"sexually explicit content" to expression "having as a dominant theme" any "lascivious descrip-
tion or depiction of sexual conduct or sexual excitement" VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-804 (Michie
Supp. 1999), recodified at § 2.2-2827 (2001). However, the Commonwealth's revision to the
Act does not change the analysis. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 438-39 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
Many works of public import could be classified as lascivious, such as "the works of Toni
Morrison and many themes found in Victorian poetry[,]... material researched online by one
of the plaintiffs[,] ... [and] e-mail discussions. ... " Id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
259. See Urofsy, 216 F.3d at 415 (concluding that because Act does not infringe constitu-
tional rights of public employees in general, it also does not violate rights of professors).
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ity, the critical issue was whether the Act restricted speech by state employees
in their capacity as citizens speaking on matters of public concern.2"
Judge Wilkins relied on the Supreme Court's public employee free speech
precedents ofPickering, Connick, Waters, and NTEUto establish a distinction
between the state employees' speech in their capacity as citizens upon matters
of public concern and in their professional speech. 6 Judge Wilkins empha-
sized that the state constitutionally could control professional speech because
"to pursue its legitimate goals effectively, the state must retain the ability to
control the manner in which its employees discharge their duties . ,,262 The
majority then rejected the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim because the
speech at issue was made in the employees' role as employees.263
Specifically, Judge Wilkins analogized the restrictions on speech by
public employees in their capacity as employees to restrictions on govern-
ment-funded speech.2" He cited Rust v. Sullivan26 for its proposition that in
the situation of government-fimded speech, the government is "entitled to
control the content of the speech because it has, in a meaningful sense, 'pur-
chased' the speech at issue through a grant of funding or payment of a
salary."2 6 Judge Wilkins then equated government-funded speech with all
260. See id. at 406 (noting that threshold inquiry is "whether the Act regulates speech by
state employees in their capacity as citizens or as citizens upon matters of public concern").
"The majority's interpretation of the 'public concern' doctrine makes the role of the speaker dis-
positive of the analysis." Id. at 435 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
261. See id. at 406-09 (analyzing Pickering and its progeny as cases in which main focus
is on capacity of speaker).
262. Id. at 409. Judge Wilkins noted that "[i]f a public employee's speech made in his
capacity as a private citizen does not touch upon matter of public concern, the state, as employer,
may regulate it without infringing any First Amendment protection." Id. at 406 (citing Connick,
461 U.S. 138,146 (1983); Holland v. Rimmer, 25 F.3d 1251, 1254-55 & n.1 I (4th Cir. 1994)).
263. Id. at 408. Significantly, Judge Wilkins cited a Fifth Circuit case for the proposition
that an inquiry into whether a matter is of public concern "does not involve a determination of
how interesting or important the subject of an employee's speech is." Id. at 407 (citing Terrell
v. Univ. of Tex Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1362 (5th Cir. 1987)). Additionally, Judge Wilkins
asserted that the location of the speech is irrelevant. Id. This is followed by an odd juxtaposi-
tion of the Diteglio and Connick holdings, so that whether the employee makes the speech as
an employee or as a private citizen determines "whether [the] speech touches upon a matter of
public concern." Id.
264. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 408 n.6.
265. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). In Rust, the Court rejected an argument that regulations
prohibiting abortion counseling in a federally funded project violated. the First Amendment
rights of the staff of clinics accepting federal funds. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198-99
(1991). The Court reasoned that "[tihe employees' freedom of expression is limited during the
time that they actually work for the project; but this limitation is a consequence of their decision
to accept employment in a project, the scope of which is permissibly restricted by the funding
authority." Id. at 199.
266. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 408 n.6.
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public employee speech.26 In his view, the insistence that a public employee
is entitled to First Amendment protection for speech made in the course of his
employment duties "creates a fundamental and unnecessary schism between
government-employee speech cases and government funding cases.
''268
The Uroftky plaintiffs' claimed that even if the Act was valid as to the
majority of state employees, it violated the First Amendment scholarly rights
of professors at state colleges and universities. 269 . In response, the majority
distinguished Keylshian and Sweezy - both of which recognized academic
freedom as a "special concern" of the First Amendment - on the ground that
those cases actually did not set aside a state regulation on the basis that it
infringed a First Amendment right to academic freedom.270 Moreover,, the
majority said, "to the extent it has constitutionalized a right of academic
freedom at all, the Supreme Court appears to have recognized only an institu-
tional right of self-governance in academic affairs.""' The Fourth Circuit
267. Id.
268. Id. Judge Wilkins believed that under the analysis of Judge Wilkinson and Judge
Murnaghan, a public employee would possess a First Amendment right to challenge his
employer's directions regarding, "for example, the preparation and con-tent [sic] of a report,
while the same directions issued with respect to a report prepared pursuant to a grant of funding
would not be subject to a First Amendment challenge." Id. Judge Wilkins stated that Judge
Wilkinson and Judge Murnaghan failed to recognize the importance of the role of the speaker
in determining whether speech by a public employee is entitled to First Amendment protection.
Id. at 408.
269. See id. at 409-10.
270. See id. at 412 (citing Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465
U.S. 271,287 (1984), for proposition that Supreme Court has not recognized First Amendment
right of faculty to participate in academic polieymaking). The majority found that to the extent
that Whitehill, Shelton, and WReman may have held that a publicly employed teacher could not
be disciplined for exercise of First Amendment rights as a private citizen, "that holding has been
subsumed by later cases extending the same protection to all public employees." Id. at 414. But
see discussion supra Parts m-IV for opposing interpretation of interrelation between doctrine
of academic freedom and public employee speech cases.
271. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 412. Judge Wilkins began with a brief review of the history of
the concept of academic freedom in the United States. See id. at 410-12 (noting influence of
German notion of academic freedom in United States and discussing AAUP's professional
definition of academic freedom). In view of this history, Judge Wilkins stated that plaintiffs
"fail[ed] to appreciate that the wisdom of a given practice as a matter of policy does not give
the practice constitutional status." Id. at 411 n.12 (citing Minnesota State Boardfor Community
Colleges '. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 288 (1984), for proposition that "[flaculty involvement in
academic governance has much to recommend it as a matter of academic policy, but it finds no
basis in the Constitution"). Judge Wilkins also found it significant that the "Court has never
recognized that professors possess a First Amendment right of academic freedom to determine
for themselves the content of their courses and scholarship, despite opportunities to do so." Id.
at 414. This reading severely distorts the meaning of the academic freedom cases. See supra
Part III (discussing Supreme Court's recognition of academic freedom).
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 299 (2002)
therefore reversed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the Act
did not infringe upon the constitutional rights of public employees." 2
b. Concurring Opinions
The concurring opinions in Urofsky are relevant because two out of the
three separate concurring opinions found that Judge Wilkins misapplied the
Pickering-Connick balancing test to the scholarly speech of state-employed
professors."' For example, Judge Hamilton again concurred in the judgment,
while disputing the rationale.274 As before, he cited Fourth Circuit precedent
for his view that the circuit's prior, but incorrect, decision in Boring dictated
the result due to stare decisis. 275 Judge Hamilton stated that, "[l]eft to my own
devices, I would hold that the [plaintiffs'] speech in this case is entitled to
some measure of First Amendment protection."
276
In a separate opinion, Chief Judge Wilkinson concurred in the judgment
while disagreeing with the majority's refusal to recognize that public employ-
ees enjoy some First Amendment protection in connection with their work" 7
The majority erred "by placing exclusive emphasis on the fact that the statute
covered speech of state employees in their capacity as employees." 278 Further-
more, the majority did not examine the content and context of the expression
272. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 416. In reaching this conclusion, the majority noted that the Act
places the authority to approve or disapprove research projects with the university. Id. at 415
n.17. Thus, the majority found that the Act left decisions concerning subjects of faculty
research in the hands of the institution. Id. However, in a footnote, the majority stated that
"while a denial of an application under the Act based upon a refusal to approve a particular
research project might raise genuine questions - perhaps even constitutional ones - concerning
the extent of the authority of a university to control the work of its faculty, such questions are
not presented here." Id.
273. See id. at 425-26 (Hamilton, J., concurring) (implying inapplicability of Pickering-
Connick balancing testy, see also id. at 426-35 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (discussing
importance of academic freedom).
274. See Urojksy, 216 F.3d at 425-26 (Hamilton, J., concurring) (concurring in majority's
opinion).
275. See id. at 425 (Hamilton, J., concurring) (finding that majority correctly concluded
under "implicit" holding of Fourth Circuit's en bane decision in Boring v. Buncombe County
Board of Education, 136 F.3d 364, 365 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc), that speech at issue in
Urofsky is employee speech and therefore not entitled to First Amendment protection).
276. Id. at 425 (Hamilton, J., concurring). Judge Hamilton wrote separately to make clear
that the Fourth Circuit left unanswered the question of "whether a governmental employee who
seeks to access and disseminate sexually explicit materials rising to the level of matters of public
concern, not in his or her role as a governmental employee, but rather as a private citizen, is
entitled to some measure of First Amendment protection." Id. at 426 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
277. See id. at 426-35 (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring) (disputing majority's reasoning but
concurring in judgment).
278. Id. at 426 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
346
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restricted by the Act, i.e., university scholarship that addressed matters of
public concern. 9 Additionally, Chief Judge Wilkinson stated that:
Academic freedom is necessary to informed political debate. Academic
curiosity is critical to useful social discoveries .... The content of this
research does not involve a professor's wages or working conditions.
Rather it concerns an aggregate of subjects with broad social impact -
subjects touching ourphysical health, our mental well-being, our economic
prosperity, and ultimately our appreciation for the world around us and the
different heritages that have brought that world about. The right to aca-
demic inquiry into such subjects cannot be divorced from access to one
means (the Internet) by which that inquiry is carried out By restricting
Internet access, a state thus restricts academic inquiry at what maybecome.
its single most fruitful source.'
The context of the affected speech was also unique because in the university
setting "the [Commonwealth] acts against a background and tradition of
thought that is at the center of our intellectual tradition."12 1  Chief Judge
Wilkinson noted that although plaintiffs were state employees, they were
hired for the "purpose of inquiring into, reflecting upon, and speaking out on
matters of public concern. '
Consequently, Chief Judge Wilkinson took issue with Judge Wilkins's
equation of government-funded speech with public employee speech.2' The
Supreme Court in Rust v. Sullivan5 4 drew a distinction between a physician's
speech on the one hand and a university professor's speech on the other." s
279. See id. at 428 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (stating that academic freedom is matter
of public concern because it is "of tascendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned" (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 384 U.S. 489,603 (1967))).
280. Id. (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
281. Id. at 428 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995)).
282. Id. (Wilkinson, C., concurring) (citations omitted). A faculty is employed profes-
sionally to test ideas and to propose solutions, to deepen knowledge and to refresh perspectives.
See Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 87 (commenting that "[a] faculty, especially a research
faculty, is employed professionally to test and propose revisions in the prevailing wisdom ....
Its function is primarily one of critical review .... Its purpose is likewise to train others to the
same critical skills.").
283. Id. at 428-29 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
284. 500 U.S. 173 (1990).
285. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991). In Rust, the Supreme Court upheld
federal regulations that prohibited recipients of Title X grants from engaging in abortion related
activities. Id. at 203. The Rust Court emphasized that the government simply was refusing to
fund activities (including speech that promoted those activities) when the scope of the project
excluded such activities. Id. at 193-94. The Court also stressed that employees in a Title X
project remained free to pursue abortion related activities on their own time, when they were
347
59 WASH. &LEE L. REV 299 (2002)
The Rust Court said:
[VIe have recognized that the university is a traditional sphere of free
expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Govern-
ment's ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions
attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment.'
Thus, in Urofsky, Chief Judge Wilkinson emphasized that beginning and end-
ing the public concern inquiry with the signature on the professors' paychecks
or the serial number on their computers "would be to permit all manner of
content and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech and research conducted in
our universities."' As Chief Judge Wilkinson pointed out, professors are far
from "state mouthpieces" in their research and writing.'
Intrinsic to Chief Judge Wilkinson's analysis was his belief that the
enterprise of university research and writing differs fundamentally from
secondary school curriculum selection."' Distinguishing the facts in Boring'
from those of Uroftky, Chief Judge Wilkinson stated that while curricular
choices can be perceived to bear the imprimatur of the school,"' "[n]o one
not acting under the auspices of the Title X project. Id. at 198-99. The Rust Court recognized
that while employees actually were working on the Title X project, their freedom of expression
was limited, but that "this limitation is a consequence of their decision to accept employment
in a project, the scope of which is permissibly restricted by the funding authorities." Id.
286. Id. (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)).
287. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 429 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Wilkinson noted
that by embracing the Commonwealth's view that "all work-related speech by public employees
is beyond public concern, the majority sanction[ed] state legislative interference in public
universities without limit." Id. at 429-30.
288. Id. at 428 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
289. See id. at 429-30 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (distinguishing facts of Boring and
Urofsk). Boring involved an individual employment decision pertaining to curriculum at the
secondary school level, while Urofsky involved a broadly applicable statute unrelated to
curriculum at the level of higher education. Id. at 429 n.3 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
290. 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc); see also supra notes 254-57 and accompany-
ing text (setting out facts of Boring case).
291. Id. at 429 n.4 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring). In a footnote, Chief Judge Wilkinson
asserted that courts dealing with the question of First Amendment rights concerning curriculum
choices "have limited their holdings to curriculum matters in light of the distinctly institutional
character of curriculum decisions: '[A] public university professor does not have a First
Amendment right to decide what will be taught in the classroom.'" Id. (Wilkinson, C.J.,
concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Edwards v. Ca. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488,491 (3d
Cir. 1998)). Chief Judge Wilkinson further noted that "'[ajlthough the concept of academic
freedom has been recognized in our jurisprudence, the doctrine has never conferred upon
teachers the control of public school curricula.'" Id. (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (quoting
Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989)).
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assumes when reading a professor's work that it bears the imprimatur of the
government or that it carries the approval of his or her academic institu-
tion."2 Thus, Chief Judge Wilkinson recognized that professors have a First
Amendment interest in the content of their Internet research. 29
Chief Judge Wilkinson concurred in the judgment, however, because he
believed that despite the high burden established by NTEU, the Common-
wealth had proven that the expression's impact on the operation of the Gov-
ernment outweighed the interests of the plaintiffs and of society in the expres-
sion restricted by the Act.2' Moreover, he found that the prior permission
requirement was only "a minimal intrusion on academic inquiry." Chief
Judge Wilkinson concluded that the waiver provision preserved the structure
of university self-governance and thus saved the Act from contravening the
Constitution.'
In his own separate concurrence, Judge Luttig provided a detailed coun-
ter argument for the major points stated by Chief Judge Wilkinson.2  Judge
Luttig concluded that there is no constitutional right of free inquiry unique to
professors or to any other public employee and that the First Amendment
292. Urof4, 216 F.3d at 429 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Wilkinson
found it significant that state university professors work in the context of considerable academic
independence - "in their research and writing university professors are not state mouthpieces -
they speak mainly for themselves." Id. at 428 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring). See generally
Rabban, supra note 28, at 242-44 (discussing independence necessary for public university
professors).
293. See Urofiky, 216 F.3d at 429-31 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (finding that Act
restricted speech on matters of public concern).
294. Id. at 431 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454,468 (1994)) (internal quotations omitted).
295. Id. at 432 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Wilkinson additionally stated
that "federal courts have no business acting as surrogate university deans" and that "[w]here the
state ... has worked within the traditional governance structure for educational institutions, the
hand of the federal judiciary should ordinarily be stayed." Id. at 433 (Wilkinson, C.J., concur-
ring). But see supra Part III.B.2 (emphasizing that institutional academic freedom does not
replace individual academic freedom).
296. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 433-34 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring). But see infra Part
VIA (analyzing waiver provision as impermissible content-based restriction and prior re-
straint).
297. See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 416-25 (Luttig, J., concurring) (writing to join Judge Wil-
kins's "fine opinion for the court" and to show that "[tlhe Supreme Court's precedents would
not countenance the contrary conclusion reached by Judge Wilkinson and the dissent"). Judge
Luttig also stated that chronicling the analytical flaws in Judge Wilkinson's analysis was
important because, "[cloliectively, each building upon each other, these errors disguise... even
from Judge Wilkinson, the uncomfortably counter-precedential and counter-intuitive con-
clusions that he can, as a result, reach seemingly quite comfortably." Id. at 424 (Luttig, J., con-
curring).
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protects the rights of all public employees equally.2" He noted that academic
freedom is "paradigmatic of the truism that not all that we treasure is in need
of constitutionalization" because "[n]o university worthy of the name would
ever attempt to suppress true academic freedom - constrained or uncon-
strained by a constitution."
29
c. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Murnaghan and three other judges dissented because they believed
the majority adopted an unduly restrictive interpretation of the public concern
doctrine.3" They concluded that the Act's restriction on research, writing, and
discussion by university professors, librarians, museum workers, physicians,
and social workers touched on matters of public concern and therefore merited
constitutional protection.3"' In the dissent's view, the legislature's revision of
the Act did not change the analysis because many works of public import can
be classified as lascivious, including the works of Toni Morrison, themes
found in Victorian poetry, e-mail discussions by psychologists, and publica-
tions regarding abnormal sexual behavior."°
Reaching the NTEUbalancing test, the dissent found that the Act was not
narrowly tailored to serve the State's asserted interests. 33 The Act was under-
inclusive because it addressed neither nonsexual nor noncomputer-related
causes of workplace inefficiency and because it ignored books, calendars,
pictures, and other off-line material that might create a sexually hostile work
environment?" Equally important, the Act was over-inclusive because it
reached a vast amount of legitimate, nonharassing research and communica-
tion.0 The dissent stated that the prior approval process did not save the Act
298. Id. at 425 (Luttig, J., concurring) (writing to deny existence of "academic freedom"
because "the true academic is actually in no need of such attempts at support - least of all from
the federal judiciary").
299. Id. at 425 (Luttig, J., concurring) (stating that even if university suppresses true
academic freedom, it would "find itself without its faculty" and "without the public support
necessary for its very existence").
300. Id. at 435 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 438 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 438-39 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting). The legislature revised the Act by limiting
the definition of "sexually explicit content" to materials and descriptions that are "lascivious."
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-804 (Michie Supp. 1999), recodified at § 2.2-2827 (2001); see also notes
218, 221 (explaining amendment).
303. See id. at 439-41 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting) (concluding that under-inclusiveness and
over-inclusiveness of Act shows "[the] 'obvious lack of "fit" between the government's purported
interest and the sweep of its restrictions'" (quoting Sanjour v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85,95 (1995))).
304. Id. at 440 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 440-41 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting).
350
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because the "mere existence of the licensor's unfettered discretion, coupled
with the power of prior restraint, intimidates parties into censoring their own
speech, even if the discretion and power are never actually abused. ' 3" Conse-
quently, the dissent found that '"the Act did not survive the heightened scrutiny
applied to statutory restrictions on employee speech."3"
V. Analysis and Implications of Urofsky
In Urofsky, the Fourth Circuit stripped the core of academic freedom by
ruling that academic freedom provides no protection to the academic inquiry
and research of individual professors."° Instead of according academic
research and writing full First Amendment protection, the Fourth Circuit
applied the more restrictive Pickering-Connick balancing test.309 As a result,
the Fourth Circuit chilled academic research and writing by contravening the
Supreme Court's prohibition against content-based discrimination and imper-
missible prior restraints. 1
The Fourth Circuit's application of the Pickering-Connick balancing test
to the scholarly speech of public university professors misconstrues the primary
mission of academia."' Individual scholarly research, writing, and publication
lies at the heart of higher education and comes within the First Amendment's
protection of academic freedom.' Academic inquiry is "necessary to in-
306. Id. at 441 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750,757 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
307. Id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
308. See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 412 (finding that Supreme Court has recognized only
"institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs"). But see infra Part VI.A (asserting
that Supreme Court specifically constitutionalized right of academic freedom for protection of
scholarly research and inquiry).
309. See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 406-09 (misreading Pickering and Connick as establishing
premise that all job-related inquiry and expression by public employees has no constitutional
protection); see also infra Part VI.B (discussing inapplicability of Pickering-Connick balancing
test to scholarly speech).
310. See infra Part VI.C (arguing that Fourth Circuit's approval of Virginia Act's licensing
scheme contravenes Supreme Court First Amendment rulings because Virginia Act discrimi-
nates based on content and constitutes impermissible prior restraint).
311. See AAUP Urofsky Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at 13 (recognizing that "[sltate-
employed university scholars are expected to pursue their own research and express their own
views in the classroom and through publications, conferences, and research"). The AAUP
Amicus Brief went on to state that "[a]s part of their job responsibilities, professors conduct
research, write, teach, publish, and debate with colleagues and students." Id. Ultimately, "[i]t
makes no sense to expect professors to engage in critical inquiry and simultaneously to allow
punishment for its exercise." Id. at 13-14 (citation omitted).
312. See Edgar Dyer, Collegiality 's Potential Chill Over Faculty Speech: Demonstrating
the Need for a Refined Version of Pickering and Connick for Public Higher Education, 119
EDUC. L. REP. 309, 318 (1997) (discussing flaws of Pickering analysis as applied to public
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formed public debate" and academic curiosity is "critical to useful social
discoveries." '313 Thus, the scholarly speech of professors, with its truth-seeking
mission, should be protected outside of the Pickering-Connick framework. 14
A. Constitutional Academic Freedom Protects the Freedom of Research
and Inquiry of Individual Professors
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Urofsky conflicts with the Supreme
Court's holdings that the doctrine of academic freedom protects scholarly
speech.3"5 No other court of appeals has denied the existence of individual
academic freedom.3" 6 By asserting that academic freedom "inheres in the
University, not in individual professors," the Fourth Circuit majority dramati-
call departed from the established meaning of academic freedom under the
First Amendment.317
higher education); see also infra Part VIA (distinguishing between scholarly speech and
general public employee speech).
313. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 428 (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring).
314. See infra Part VIA (concluding that Pickering-Connick analysis should not be
applied to academic speech protected under doctrine of academic freedom).
315. See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 59-60 (1967) (declaring that "[w]e are in
the First Amendment field. The continuing surveillance which this type of law places on
teachers is hostile to academic freedom." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (recognizing individual academic freedom as
constitutionally protected right); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957)
(plurality opinion) (noting importance of academic speech in doctrine of academic freedom);
see also AAUP Urofsky Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at 4 (finding that Supreme Court prece-
dents, which at least five federal courts of appeals expressly follow, recognize that First
Amendment protects academic freedom of state-employed professors).
316. See, e.g., Burnham v. lanni, 119 F.3d 668,680 n.19 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (noting
that "professors' academic freedom" was "a 'special concern of the First Amendment'")
(citations omitted); Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968,971-72 (9th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that college's vague sexual harassment policy, which had been applied to punish
professor's classroom expression, infringed upon individual academic freedom principles);
Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 597-98 (2d Cir. 1990) (recognizing that professor's
academic freedom was constitutionally protected "'based on [his] discussion of controversial
topics in his classroom'") (alteration in original) (citation omitted); Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d
821, 829 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that university violated professor's "First Amendment right
to academic freedom" when it ordered professor to change student's original grade); Dow
Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) (observing that "whatever constitu-
tional protection is afforded by the First Amendment extends as readily to the scholar in the
laboratory as to the teacher in the classroom"); see also AAUP Urofsky Amicus Brief, supra
note 9, at 8-9 (commenting that by limiting First Amendment academic freedom to institutions,
Fourth Circuit majority decision clearly conflicted with at least five other courts of appeals that
specifically recognized professors' First Amendment right of academic freedom).
317. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000) (en bane), cerL denied,
531 U.S. 1070 (2001) (holding that doctrine of academic freedom protects institutions only in
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For example, in Dow Chemical Company v. Allen," the Seventh Circuit
held that a professor's First Amendment right of academic freedom extends
to research and teaching.319 Observing that "whatever constitutional protec-
tion is afforded by the First Amendment extends as readily to the scholar in
the laboratory as to the teacher in the classroom," the court refused to issue a
subpoena for materials based on toxicity studies in a university laboratory? °
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the position of the professors, that individual
scholarly research "lies at the heart of higher education" and therefore "comes
within the First Amendment's protection of academic freedom.
321
The mission of higher education includes the seeking of the truth as well
as the discovery and improvement of knowledge.3z Scholarly speech is
neither ordinary employee workplace speech nor common public debate.
Thus, academic speech deserves full First Amendment protection under the
doctrine of academic freedom.
B. Disregarding the Pickering-Connick Test for Academic Free Speech
If academic freedom is to remain a special concern of the First Amend-
ment, as the Supreme Court recognized in Sweezy, Keyishian, and Ewing, then
courts should refrain from applying the Pickering-Connick balancing test to
professors' academic speech at colleges and universities. 323 Rather, courts
should give the full First Amendment protection of strict scrutiny to the
spoken, written, or artistic expressions of an academician who is engaging in
their corporate capacities); see also supra Parts U-MI (discussing established professional and
constitutional definitions of "academic freedom").
318. 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982).
319. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1274-75 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that
professor's First Amendment right of academic freedom extends to research as well as to
teaching).
320. Id. at 1275.
321. Id. at 1274; see Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll., 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985)
(recognizing individual academic freedom).
322. See Dyer, supra note 312, at 319 (noting that mission of higher education is not
only simple dissemination of knowledge, but also mission of discovering and improviig knowl-
edge).
323. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985) (holding that academic
freedom is "a special concern of the First Amendment"); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1969) (announcing that academic freedom is "a special concern of the First Amend-
ment"); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,250-51 (1957) (plurality opinion) (implicitly
connecting academic freedom with First Amendment); Fugate, supra note 182, at 215 (agreeing
that courts should not apply Connick and Waters when dealing with professors' speech in
colleges and universities); see also supra Part I (discussing evolution of academic freedom
in Supreme Court).
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this expression as an academician.324 However, a professor who is expressing
simply as a citizen or public employee should be treated as any other citizen
or public employee. 2
The Pickering Court established a balancing test to determine when a
public employer may dismiss a public employee based on statements made
by the employee that cause disruption to close working relationships that are
necessary to perform public services efficiently.326 The government, like a
private employer, is entitled to restrict the speech of its employees to protect
its orderly internal processes.32' Therefore, when university professors are
speaking as general public employees, courts should engage in the Picker-
ing-Connick analysis to arrive at a balance between* the interests of the
public university professor, as a citizen, in commenting about matters of
public concern, and the interest of the government, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.
However, the Pickering-Connick analysis should not apply in evaluating
the First Amendment claims of professors regarding their freedom of inquiry
and other scholarly pursuits. 2 Professors deserve more freedom from em-
ployer control than typical employees because scholarly independence is a
prerequisite for the proper performance of academic work. 9 Thus, when an
324. See Dyer, supra note 312, at 319-20 (suggesting guidelines for development of new
standard).
325. See id. (suggesting that Pickering standard should apply to any speech of "a personal
nature or ad hominem attacks, as opposed to negative critiques of another's work"). Dyer
stated that the Pickering standard should "apply to professors' complaints, as employees, about
institutional matters like curriculum content, grading, admission standards, or other policies."
Id.
326. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (establishing balancing test
for public employee speech); see also supra Part rVA (analyzing Pickering).
327. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (stating that threshold inquiry under
Pickering balancing test is whether speech relates to matter of "public concern"). Public em-
ployee speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection if it is of "purely personal concern
to the employee - most typically, a private personnel grievance." Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d
992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotations omitted); see also supra Part IV (discussing
Pickering-Connick balancing test).
328. See Kimberly K. Caster, Case Note, Burnham v. Ianni: The Eighth Circuit Forges
Protection for the Free Speech Rights of Public University Professors Outside the Pickering-
Connick-Waters Analysis, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 883, 961-62 (1999) (noting that Eighth
Circuit refused to apply Pickering-Connick-Waters analysis to university professors' scholarly
speech); see also Weiner, supra note 256, at 630 (observing that Pickering test seems inapposite
for analyzing First Amendment claims of teachers regarding their in-class speech).
329. See Rabban, supra note 28, at 242 (noting that requirement of scholarly independence
for proper performance of academic work entitles professor to more freedom from employer
control than typical employee).
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Act or administrative action targets academic speech, the First Amendment
standard of strict scrutiny should apply.3
This is the view taken by the Eighth Circuit in Burnham v. Ianni.33' The
Eighth Circuit held that a university violated the First Amendment academic
freedom of two history department faculty members by removing two photo-
graphic portraits from a history department display case.332 The court refused
to apply the Pickering-Connick analysis on the grounds that the case did not
present a question of public employee discipline or termination. 33 Instead,
the court concluded that the professors' expressive speech deserved full First
Amendment protection. 34 Significantly, the court recognized that its decision
specifically protected the professors' academic freedom.335
The Eighth Circuit correctly -concluded that the Pickering-Connick
analysis was not triggered because the facts did not present an employee
discipline or discharge case.336 Taking the Eighth Circuit's analysis one step
further, application of the Pickering-Connick framework to the scholarly
speech of university professors is inappropriate. The scholarly research,
writing, and publication of state-employed professors merits full protection
under the doctrine of academic freedom.
C. Impermissible Content-Based Discrimination and Prior Restraint
Although the right of free speech is not absolute, the First Amendment
generally prevents the government from proscribing speech of any kind simply
330. See Hiers, supra note 3, at 106 (stating that value of academic free speech "both to
teachers and the larger society should not be reduced to shreds and patches merely for the sake
of putative governmental interests when those interests involve little more than administrative
superiors' desire to assert their authority").
331. 19 F.3d 668, 671-74 (8th Cir. 1997) (en bane).
332. Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668,671-74 (8th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (finding individual
academic freedom violated when administrator ordered professors to remove materials concern-
ing military history from display case). A professor had asserted that the photographs were
inappropriate and constituted sexual harassment, but the history department professors claimed
that they were attempting "to convey and advocate their scholarly and professorial interests in
military history and in military weaponry's part in their vocation." Id. at 674.
333. Id. at 678.
334. See id. at 675 (stating that "[b]ecause this case involves [the university's] suppression
of [the professors'] protected speech, [the professors] have . . . sufficiently established a
violation of a constitutional right"). The Eighth Circuit found that university administrators
engaged in illegal viewpoint discrimination within a nonpublic forum. Id. at 675-76.
335. See id. at 680 n.1 9 (noting that professors' academic freedom was "a 'special concern
of the First Amendment"') (citations omitted). Thus, the Eighth Circuit applied strict scrutiny
to the professors' expression.
336. See id. at 678 (emphasizing that Picketing standard applies to determinations of
whether public employer has been properly discharged or disciplined for engaging in speech).
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because it disapproves of the ideas expressed.33 With a few exceptions, most
speech receives First Amendment protection.3 The First Amendment's
protection extends even to indecent speech.3 9 Therefore, if scholarly speech
receives full First Amendment protection, it may be limited only when the
State clearly has established a compelling and narrowly drawn interest.34
1. Content-Based Discrimination
The Supreme Court has stated that content-based discrimination cannot
be tolerated under the First Amendment.34' Underlying this principle is the
recognition that "content-based burdens on speech. . . raise the specter that
the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace."342 To justify such restrictions, the government must demon-
337. See RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (stating that prohibition of
speech based on simple disapproval is unconstitutional).
338. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982) (deciding that child pornography
is unprotected speech under First Amendment due to low value of communication to society);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (holding that obscene speech is unprotected
speech); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (concluding that offensive language is
protected under First Amendment); Chaplinaky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
(describing fighting words that tend to invoke violent reaction from hearer as unprotected
speech).
339. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (holding
that First Amendment protects indecent communication).
340. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973) (noting that
freedom of speech or expression is fundamental right and, as such, judicial standard of review
for alleged unconstitutional restrictions is strict scrutiny). Under strict scrutiny review, the
government must show a compelling interest in the regulation and a narrow tailoring to achieve
its goals. Id. See also Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 78, for the following discussion:
There is, of course, nothing.., that assumes that the First Amendment subset
of academic freedom is a total absolute, any more than freedom of speech is
itself an exclusive value prized literally above all else. Thus, the false shouting
of fire in a crowded theater may not immunize a professor of psychology from
having to answer for the consequences of the ensuing panic, even assuming that
he did it in order to observe crowd reaction first-hand and solely to advance the
'general enlightenment we may otherwise possess of how people act under great
and sudden stress.
Id.
341. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984) (stating that regulations that
permit Government to discriminate on basis of content of message cannot be tolerated); see also
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994) ("Turner I") (recognizing that
Supreme Court precedent applies exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage,
or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content).
342. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 116 (1991).
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strate a compelling interest, and the restrictions must be narrowly tailored to
meet that objective 43 Furthermore, when a statute is a content-based blanket
restriction on speech, it "cannot be 'properly analyzed as a form of time,
place, and manner regulation."$ 113W
The Virginia law at issue in Urofsky singled out "sexually explicit"
material found on the Internet for burdensome regulation and public scru-
tiny.345 As noted by the district court, the Act's poor fit and the availability
of content-neutral alternatives suggested that the Act was intended to discour-
age discourse on sexual topics, "not because it hampers public functions but
simply because [the state] disagree[s] with the content of the employees'
speech."3" This constitutes an impermissible content-based restriction under
Supreme Court precedent.347 The content-based restriction of faculty expres-
343. See id. at 118 (setting out strict scrutiny standard).
344. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,868 (1997) (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986)).
345. See VA. CODEANN. § 2.1-805 (Michie Supp. 1999),recodifiedat § 2.2-2827(2001)
(singling out "lascivious" material). The Urof4 Brief for Petitioner stated the following:
Any state-employed writer, researcher, professor, or librarian investigating "sexu-
ally explicit" material in the arts, literature, social science, or medicine is barred
from doing so unless she or he takes the affirmative step of requesting a license,
which may or may not be granted, in the unfettered discretion of the "agency head"
and which, if granted - as the Act makes a point of providing - is then subject to
scrutiny by any politician or pressure group that chooses to make an issue over the
controversial, "offensive," or "immoral" subjects being studied with taxpayer-
funded resources.
Urofsky Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 21-22.
346. Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634, 643 (E.D. Va. 1998) (alteration in original)
(quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court in Urofsky held that "[gliven the over- and underinclusiveness of the Act and
the existence of content-neutral alternatives... [t]he Act violate[d] the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 643-44. Significantly, the Urofsky Petitioner's Brief stated the following:
[Bloth the prior restraint licensing requirement and the public disclosure provision
chill academic discourse and other bona fide research about sexuality by making
scholars think very carefully before requesting a license and administrators think
equally hard about the possible political consequences before granting it. Thus...
the licensing scheme does not enhance institutional academic autonomy but
interferes with it by imposing unnecessary and inhibiting burdens on universities
and targeting research and writing on a subject of which the legislature disapproves.
Urofsky Petitioner's Brief, supra note 9, at 22.
347. See, e.g., RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (stating that
"[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid"); F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 384 (1984) (noting that "[t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based
regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of
public discussion of an entire topic" (alteration in original) (citations omitted)); Consol. Edison
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (stating that constitutionally permissible
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sion on public university Web Servers thus violates the First Amendment
academic freedom rights of the university faculty members' scholarly speech.
2. Prior Restraint
Furthermore, Virginia's licensing scheme is an impermissible prior
restraint on sexual matters.3 4' The statute's approval process requires profes-
sors to seek permission to access sexually explicit materials "to the extent
required in conjunction with a bona fide, agency-approved research project
or other agency-approved undertaking."' 9 As the Fourth Circuit dissent
noted, the Act's prior approval process did not contain a check on the discre-
tionary authority of state agencies and such "grants of unbridled discretion to
government agents invites arbitrary enforcement."3"0  Even if one could
assume that approvals would not be withheld arbitrarily, the "mere existence
of the licensor's unfettered discretion, coupled with the power of prior re-
straint, intimidates parties into censoring their own speech, even if the discre-
tion and power are never actually abused." '' Even those professors who
receive permission to speak may engage in self-censorship, ultimately to the
time, place, or manner restriction may not be based upon either content or subject matter of
speech).
348. See AAUP Urofsky Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at 16-19 (arguing that Common-
wealth's licensing scheme is "clearly an impermissible prior restraint on serious inquiry into
sexual matters").
349. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-805 (Michie Supp. 1999), recodified at § 2.2-2827 (2001)
(emphasis added). The AAUP Urofsky Amicus Brief states the following:
[B]oth the prior restraint licensing requirement and the public discourse provision
chill academic discourse and other bona fide research about sexuality by making
scholars think very carefully before requesting a license and administrators think
equally hard about the possible political consequences before granting it. Thus,
contrary to the claims of the Commonwealth and the Fourth Circuit majority, the
licensing scheme does not enhance institutional academic autonomy but interferes
with it by imposing unnecessary and inhibiting burdens on universities and target-
ing research and writing on a subject of which the legislature disapproves.
AAUP Urofsky Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at 22.
350. Urofsky, 216 F.3d 401,441 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1070
(2001) (Mumaghan, J., dissenting).
351. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co, 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988). The Lake-
wood Court held that:
[When the determination of who may speak and who may not is left to the unbri-
dled discretion of a government official ... we have often and uniformly held that
such statutes or policies impose censorship on the public or the press, and hence are
unconstitutional, because without standards governing the exercise of discretion,
a government official may decide who may speak and who may not based upon the
content of the speech or viewpoint of the speaker.
d at 463-64.
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detriment of the public in the form of banal and lifeless discourse.312 By
failing to apply strict scrutiny, the Fourth Circuit upheld a law that discrim-




Freedom of inquiry and scholarship is critical to informed political
debate and useful social discoveries. " The freedom to pursue research and
the right to transmit the fruits of inquiry to the wider community - without
limitations from corporate or political interests and without prior restraint or
fear of subsequent punishment - are essential to the advancement of knowl-
edge.355 Thus, when academic freedom is at issue, courts should apply full
First Amendment strict scrutiny rather than the Pickering-Connick standard."
352. See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 441 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting) (discussing Act's detriment
to public); see aLso Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (declaring that "[it is not
merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its very
existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion"); Sanjour v. E.PA. 56 F.3d 85,
97 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that "[flar from being the saving grace of this regulatory scheme -
as the government suggests - the broad discretion that the regulations vest in the agency
reinforces our belief that they are impermissible."); Rabban, supra note 2, at 1419 (1988)
(observing that prior approval scheme for scholarly research "should strike virtually everyone
as a violation of academic freedom," even absent "strong evidence of actual abuses").
353. See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 416 (upholding Virginia Act that broadly banned all sexually
explicit on-line research and discussion in art, literature, psychology, science, and law).
354. See Byrne, supra note 2, at 333-40 (elaborating on policy behind constitutional right
of academic freedom). Professor Byrne perceptively states:
The disinterested search for knowledge fosters of discourse that, at its best, is
careful, critical, and ambitious. Again, the method of discourse is both a good in
itself and a benefit to society ... scholarly discourse creates the most favorable
environment in which thinkers may formulate ideas that stand apart from popular
opinion or fashionable error .... Disinterested and expert thought is also crucial
for society as a whole because it proves a standard by which to gauge how trivial,
debased, and false is much public discussion of affairs. It is imperative to gain
perspective on the mass of information that pours from the print and electronic
media, drivel that so often merely flatters the ignornce and cupidity of its audi-
ence .... It is important to keep vital the possibility of free intellectual excellence
lest we become lost to technically-proficient barbarism.
Id. at 334-35.
355. See Report: Academic Freedom in the Medical School, ACADEME (May 22, 1999),
available at http'/www.aaup.org/ja99rpts.htm (last visited Oct 4, 2001) (reporting on status
of academic freedom in medical schools).
356. See supra Part VI (discussing inapplicability of Pickering-Connick balancing test and
suitability of strict scrutiny standard in evaluation of First Amendment claims concerning
freedom of academic inquiry).
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As demonstrated by Urofsky, if courts apply the Pickering-Connick
balancing test to academic freedom litigation, the result can be an imposition
of severe restrictions on traditional and legitimate professional speech by
faculty at public colleges and universities. 3 7 These restrictions impede facul-
ties' ability to teach, share research findings, and publish, especially when
doing so might prompt adverse public or political reactions. The Supreme
Court warned that such restrictions would harm not only the interests of
individual professors, but also the welfare of the public and the nation.358
Disinterested scholarship and research is crucial to individual faculty
members and to society as a whole. In noting the importance of freedom of
inquiry in the development of modem civilization, the Supreme Court in
Sweezy observed, "[s]cholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion
and distrust. Teachers and students must remain free to inquire, to study, and
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise civilization will
stagnate and die."359 Unfortunately, by failing to appreciate the distinction
between garden-variety public employee speech and academic free speech or
inquiry, the Fourth Circuit assaulted a fundamental bulwark of First Amend-
ment protection.
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357. See supra Part VI (discussing implications of Urofsky). In a recently published
article, Chris Hoofnagle, Staff Counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC),
presented academic criticism of the "matter of public concern" test (i.e., the Pickering-Connick
balancing test) and suggested an alternative legal standard for determining the First Amendment
value of professors' expression. Chris Hoofnsgle, Matters of Public Concern and the Public
UniversityProfessors, 27 J.C. & U.L. 669,702-06 (2001). Although Hoofnagle took a different
route in addressing the "matter of public concern," his conclusion supports my own. Id. at 706.
Hoofnagle insightfully states the following:
[The] narrowness, unpredictability, and risk of arbitrariness makes the application
of the threshold public concern test and balancing inappropriate for judging
expression in the higher education context. In addition, balancing the value of
academic speech against potential or actual disruption is inimical to the core
principles intellectual freedom. In academe, ideas should not be suppressed based
on some potential for disruption.
Id.
358. See supra Part III (analyzing Supreme Court academic freedom cases).
359. Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality decision).
360. See Candido, supra note 68, at 120 (recognizing that "[i]f the government, acting
through public universities, can eliminate views it finds distasteful from the educational
marketplace, not only will the search for truth be hindered, but the basis of free speech as a tool
for self-governane and critical, autonomous decision-making [will be] eliminated").
